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This thesis studies three market inefficiencies that deter the financial industry.
The first one concerns the job market. Jobs in finance are highly paid. I show theo-
retically that the finance premium is due to inefficient hiring, in an industry with high
returns to talent, or talent ”scalability”. Based on a unique compensation survey among
French graduate engineers, and consistent with the model predictions, I find that the level
of wages, skewness in the wage distribution, and returns to experience are high in finance
compared with other industries. In addition, the finance premium level and evolution in
recent decades can be largely attributed to a high elasticity of compensation to size, lead
by talent scalability.
In the second paper, I analyze the equilibrium debt structure of small firms when com-
petition between lenders is non exclusive. Lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts,
the borrower can accept more than one of them, and the set of contracts that is accepted
is not observed. Two categories of lenders compete: banks that monitor their borrowers,
and uninformed lenders. The monitoring technology alleviates the moral hazard problem
but induces a fixed cost. I find that poorly-capitalized firms are only offered expensive
loans by uninformed lenders. The fraction of the loan offered by the lead bank, the in-
terest rate that is charged, and the sum of lenders’ profits decrease with the borrower’s
initial wealth.
The third paper focuses on the market of retail financial products and show how low
financial literacy is exploited by banks to escape competition. Using an academically un-
exploited database that gathers detailed information on all the retail structured products
sold on the European market since 1996, we first develop three complementary measures
of product complexity. They both exhibit an increasing trend over time. We then argue
that complexity is used as a differentiating tool by banks to inflate investor expectations
and limit competition. Evidence of strategic structuring and higher complexity in the
most competitive markets empirically comforts this hypothesis.
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Jobs in finance are highly paid. Based on a unique compensation survey among French
graduate engineers, I show that the finance premium is driven by returns to talent, or
talent “scalability”. To structure the empirical analysis, I first develop a model of the
labor market in which firms compete for industry-specific and scalable talent. Publicly
observable output induces inefficient hiring and rents. Consistent with the model pre-
dictions, I find that the level of wages, skewness in the wage distribution, and returns
to experience are high in finance compared with other industries. The finance premium
level and evolution in recent decades can be largely attributed to a high elasticity of
compensation to size, lead by talent scalability.
Keywords : Finance, compensation, wage distribution, wage structure, incentives, su-
perstars




Since the beginning of the 1980s, compensation in the financial sector has been high
compared to other sectors. Philippon and Reshef (2009), controlling for education and
other characteristics, find that wages in 2006 are 40% higher in finance than in other
industries. The recent financial crisis has stirred up the controversy on bankers’ pay,
and politicians of all stripes have reacted. But the initial question remains: why is
compensation in the financial sector so high? To answer the question I use a unique data
set on French graduate engineers, which includes the ones working abroad. Since the
latter represent a strong share of The City and Wall Street jobs, it allows to draw new
results on the finance compensation premium.
To structure the empirical analysis, this paper develops a model in which firm com-
petition for industry-specific talent leads to rents. Unlike standard superstar models
(Rosen (1981)), talent is not initially visible. Scarcity arises because only incumbent
workers have revealed industry-specific talent (Terviö (2009)). There is ample evidence
that firms compete for industry-specific talent in the financial sector. Kostovetsky (2009)
shows that the brain drain to hedge funds has led to a higher managerial turnover in
the mutual fund industries. Clarke et al. (2007) examine what happens when “all-star”
analysts move from one investment bank to another. They find that it affects positively
the relative market share of the new investment bank for equity underwriting.
In this model, once revealed, talent is publicly observable and portable across firms,
and so workers capture all the benefits from the talent discovery process. Talent consists
in any specific assets workers can bring with them while moving to another firm within
the industry. It can range from technical knowledge to address books and fame. Firms
could use two contract features to limit workers’ rents: either by making them pay for the
job ex ante, or commit to long-term wage contracts. However, financial constraints limit
novice workers ability to pay for entering the industry, and the inalienability of human
capital implies that long-term wage contracts are not enforceable.
The main assumption of the model is that talent is scalable, which leads to this key re-
sult: as talent scalability increases, worker rents increase whereas, somewhat surprisingly,
the average talent in the industry decreases. Talent scalability measures the potential of
resources and profits to grow with talent. For example, it is maximum in the markets
of novel writers or programmers, and low in physically bounded industries in which the
level of physical capital is high like the oil one. Discovering a worker’s talent is similar to
general skill training. It can increase the market value of the worker, but requires an up-
front investment consisting in bearing the risk of hiring a novice of lower talent. As talent
scalability increases, this opportunity cost increases. Consequently, firms “under-invest”,
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and the talent of the marginal worker in the industry decreases.
Based on a 1983-2010 survey among French graduate engineers, I test the empirical
predictions of the model. This survey gathers several unique specificities. First, it focuses
on the French educational elite, which is a great opportunity for the identification strategy
since the finance premium mainly concerns the top of the wage distribution (Kaplan
and Rauh (2009)). Moreover, the French educational system provides a large influx of
bankers to The City of London and Wall Street, and individuals working abroad also
are included in the data. Second, the survey covers 27 years, from 1983 to 2010, which
allows to analyze the emergence of the finance premium (Philippon and Reshef (2009)).
Finally, information concerning careers and compensation is very detailed. There is
unique information on the amount and structure of compensation, current job and career
history, and on the amount of budget and profit and losses per employee.
The first prediction of the model concerns the compensation distribution: as talent
scalability increases, level and skewness increase. Controlling for a large set of individual
characteristics, I find that finance is the sector in which French graduate engineers are
better paid, with a premium of 33% on average from 2005 to 2007. In addition, the
compensation distribution is right-skewed. The top 1% of the wage distribution captures
8.5% of the total wage pool, against 3.3% in the rest of the economy. This result is
confirmed by a quantile regression: the premium in the top decile is 7 times as high as
in the bottom decile of the distribution.
The second set of empirical predictions regards career steepness. Since industry-
specific talent is only revealed on the job, earning profile steepness and dispersion increase
in talent scalability. Estimating a standard wage equation across sub-samples ranked by
years of experience, I find that indeed both the compensation premium and variance in-
crease over years of experience. In a time-series analysis, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
shows that nearly half of the premium increase since the 1980s can be related to high
returns to experience.
Finally, the model relates compensation to size effects: the compensation premium
should be coupled with a high elasticity to size. In the 2010 survey, interviewees are asked
the budget they are in charge of. In a cross-sectional analysis, I show that compensation
elasticity to size is higher in finance than in other industries. Controlling for this inter-
action makes the financial sector premium largely disappear. In a time series analysis,
the rise in finance compensation since the 1980s can be explained by a fourfold increase
in market capitalization per employee of financial institutions.
The recent empirical literature on compensation in the financial sector has mainly
focused on two main facts. A first one is the level of compensation relatively to the rest
of the economy. Philippon and Reshef (2009) based on data from the Census Population
3
Survey, Oyer (2008) from a Stanford MBAs survey, and Goldin and Katz (2008) from a
Harvard alumni compensation survey, find that there is a finance premium from 40% in
Philippon and Reshef (2009) up to more than 100% in Oyer (2008) and Goldin and Katz
(2008). The second fact is the increase in relative compensation since the early 1980s.
Philippon and Reshef (2009) describe how, since the 1980s, compensation in finance has
increased compared to the rest of the private sector. On the other hand, Kaplan and Rauh
(2009) for US, Bell and Van Reenen (2010) for UK and Godechot (2011) for France show
that the share of the financial sector in top end brackets of the income distribution has
significantly increased. I also find an increasing wage premium in the financial industry
since the 1980s, and the main contribution of this paper is to justify it.
This paper reconciles various empirical finding related to the finance premium. Oyer
(2008) shows that the premium cannot be due to unobserved innate talent. It would
more likely be driven by finance specific skills. Kaplan and Rauh (2009) consider that
scale effects may have induced the increasing share of Wall Street workers in the top
end brackets of the wage distribution they observe. Finally, Philippon and Reshef (2009)
find that even if financial deregulation and complexity has increased the demand for high
skilled-paid employees, there is no reason why, in a world with perfect mobility across
jobs, it should lead to a large excess wage at equilibrium. They observe that steeper
and riskier lifetime wages would more plausibly explain a large part of the premium.
This paper shows that competition for finance-specific skills combined with scale effects
generate both rents and steep wage profiles.
Competing theories on the finance premium can be grouped into two categories.
Agency theory models stipulate that moral hazard would be more severe in the finance
industry. In Biais et al. (2009), increasing confidence in financial innovations would deter
employees willingness to exert effort and raise incentive costs. Axelson and Bond (2009)
develops a dynamic model in which the cost to the employer of the employee failure is
higher in the financial industry. The use of dynamic incentive devices explains why work-
ers receive rents, enter young in the financial industry, work hard in the beginning of their
career, and are fired in case of failure. But it cannot account for the skewness in the wage
distribution and size effects. On the other hand, compensating wage differential models
consider that the finance premium may pay for hard working conditions or a higher job
insecurity. However, unemployment risk in France is lower in the financial sector than in
the rest of the economy. Moreover, based on the compensation survey, I find that workers
are not less satisfied by working conditions in the financial sector than elsewhere.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section I develop a competitive model
for industry specific talent with adjustable capital. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 tests the empirical implications. Section 5 discusses other potential theories for finance
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the premium. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model analyzes the labor market outcome when firms compete for industry-specific
talent. It describes how talent scalability affects the talent discovery process and rents. It
develops implications on the wage distribution, earning profile steepness and size effects.
Its predictions will guide my empirical analysis of compensation in the financial sector.
2.1 Set-up
Consider an industry with a continuum of firms of mass 1, equal to the industry workforce.
Firms produce output by combining one worker with talent θ and adjustable capital k.
The supply of potential workers is infinite, they cannot commit to long-term contracts,
and they face an outside wage ω. Talent θ is drawn from a cumulative distribution
function T with positive support [θmin; θmax]. Both workers and firms are risk neutral
and there is no discounting.
Workers may work two periods in the industry, a novice period and a veteran period,
and then they cease to be productive. Before the novice period, the worker’s talent is
unknown to all market participants, including to himself, and has an expected value θ̂.
The market wage w0 of a novice worker is restricted to be non-negative. After the novice
period, the worker’s talent θ is revealed, publicly observable and portable across firms
within the industry. The worker receives a wage offer w(θ). Then he can decide either to
stay in the industry, and earn w(θ), or to exit the industry and earn the outside wage ω.
Let θ denote the talent threshold above which the veteran worker stays in the industry.
Firms are infinitely lived and maximize expected profits. Once matched to a firm, the
output of a worker with talent θ is
ys(k, θ) = f(k)sθ
where f(k) is an increasing and concave function and s > 0 quantifies the industry talent
scalability. The unitary cost of capital is one. Taken the worker’s talent as given, firms
adjust capital kθ to maximize profits:









Note that adjustable capital kθ increases and is convex both in talent and in talent scala-
bility. Let Φs(θ) denote the surplus produced by a worker of talent θ,
Φs(θ) = maxk {f(kθ)sθ − kθ}. Firms’ profits are given by
Πs(θ) = Φs(θ)− ws(θ)
2.2 Equilibrium
Market equilibrium is defined by the exit threshold θ. I first deduce equilibrium wages
for a given threshold θ, then I derive the equilibrium value of θ.
The equilibrium wage of a veteran results from firm competition for talent, since
talent is observable and workers cannot commit to long term wage contracts. Firms must
be indifferent between hiring the threshold type θ and any veteran with talent θ in the
industry, implying
Πs(θ) = Πs(θ)
The level of wage for a veteran of talent θ satisfies
Φs(θ)− ws(θ) = Φs(θ)− ws(θ) (2)
By definition, the threshold type is indifferent between exiting or not the industry and
therefore is paid exactly the outside wage
ws(θ) = ω (3)
Introducing (3) in (2), the veteran’s wage ws(θ) verifies
ws(θ) = ω + Φs(θ)− Φs(θ) (4)
The wage of a veteran worker of talent θ is the sum of the outside wage ω and the surplus
generated with his talent vis-à-vis the threshold veteran.
The equilibrium wage of a novice is determined by the potential talent rents in the
veteran period. Let the function Gs(θ) denote the expected surplus of a novice worker for
a given exit threshold θ. This is the sum of the net wage in the novice period w0−ω, and
the veteran talent rents: with threshold θ, a novice has a probability 1− T (θ) of staying
in the industry, in which case he gets the revenue E[wθ|θ ≥ θ]− ω as a talent rent.
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Gs(θ) = w0 − ω︸ ︷︷ ︸





E[ws(θ)|θ ≥ θ]− ω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential wage premium in the veteran period
(5)
I make the following assumption on the distribution of talent θ that guarantees that








E[Φs(θ)|θ ≥ θ∗]− Φs(θ∗)
)
(6)
Lemma 1 θ∗ exists, is unique and in the interval [θ̂; θmax].
Proof. The left-hand side of (6) is strictly increasing in θ, with a slope equal to f(k)s,
whereas the right-hand side is decreasing, with a slope equal to −(1 − T (θ))f(k)s. The
left-hand side is equal to zero at θ∗ = θ̂ while the right hand side is equal to E[Φs(θ)]−
Φs(θmin) > 0 at θ = θmin and reaches 0 at θ = θmax. Thus there is a unique solution to
(6) in the interval [θ̂; θmax].





E[Φs(θ)|θ ≥ θ∗]− Φs(θ∗)
)
> ω (7)
Assumption 1 implies that for any for any θ in [θ̂; θ∗], the novice surplus Gs(θ) is
strictly higher than zero. Indeed, Gs(θ), with a slope equal to −(1 − T (θ))f(k)s, is
decreasing over the interval [θ̂; θ∗]. Therefore, novices are always paid the minimum
initial wage w0 = 0. They cannot get more, because they are not scarce, and they cannot
get less, by assumption.
In equilibrium, firms must be indifferent between employing a threshold type and a
novice. Indeed, the inability to commit to long-term wage contracts causes them to ignore
the upside potential of a worker, and base their hiring decision on expected talent alone.
Hence, θ solves
Φs(θ̂)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit from hiring a novice
= Φs(θ)− ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from hiring the threshold veteran
Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 is satisfied, the equilibrium exit threshold θ exists, is
unique, above the population mean and is decreasing in talent scalability s.
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F is continuous and increasing over the interval [θ̂; θ∗], F (θ̂) = 0 and Assumption 1
implies that F (θ∗) > ω. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a
unique θ in the interval [θ̂; θ∗] for which Fs(θ) = ω.
I demonstrate now that θ is a decreasing function of talent scalability s. The function















Consequently, as s increases, θ decreases.
2.3 Testable Predictions
The model makes the following predictions when talent scalability varies.
2.3.1 Wage Distribution Prediction
Workers’ limited ability to pay for entering the industry leads to lifetime rents that are
increasing in talent scalability. On the one hand, as talent scalability increases, the
surplus produced by a veteran worker relatively to the threshold veteran increases, and
so wages increase for all levels of talent in the industry. The talent of the threshold
veteran, on the other hand, decreases, and so veterans capture a higher fraction of the
production surplus. Consequently, skewness in the wage distribution also increases.
Proposition 2 As talent scalability s increases, wages increase for all levels of talent
in the industry, with the highest wage increasing the most. The skewness of the wage
distribution increases.
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= f(k)θ − f(k)θ − θ
∂s
f(k)s
= f(k)(θ − θ)− θ
∂s
f(k)s
Proposition 1 implies θ
∂s
≤ 0, therefore ∂ws(θ|θ)
∂s
≥ 0: wages are increasing in talent
scalability s. In addition ∂ws(θ|θ)
∂θ∂s
= f(k) ≥ 0, and so highest wages are increasing the
most.
Empirical Evidence The existence of a wage premium in the finance industry has
been well documented in the literature. Philippon and Reshef (2009) use data of the
Census Population Survey (CPS) and finds that wages in 2006 are about 40% higher in
finance than in the rest of the economy. Oyer (2008), based on a Stanford MBAs survey,
and Goldin and Katz (2008) using data 2005 earnings from a survey among Harvard
alumni, find that this premium goes beyond 100%. On the other hand, three papers in
the literature provide some pieces of evidence on the skewness of the wage distribution.
Kaplan and Rauh (2009) finds that, in the U.S., Wall Street individuals comprise a higher
percentage of the top income brackets than non-financial executives of public companies.
Godechot (2011), based on very detailed data on the private sector in France, finds that
in 2008, the share of the financial sector in the top 0.1% of the income distribution is 10
times higher than in the rest of the population. Bell and Van Reenen (2010), with U.K.
data, show that the dispersion in the top 1% wages within finance is higher than in the
other sectors. This paper shows that the increasing premium in the financial industry
since the 1980s has come along with an increasing variance in wages.
2.3.2 Career Dynamics Prediction
Wage level and variance increase with experience. Indeed, since novices’ talent is un-
known, the latter are ex-ante identical and receive the same starting wage w0. After
having worked one period in the industry, talent is revealed and firms competition for
veterans induce wage heterogeneity. This career steepness in the wage profile increases
in talent scalability.
The model also makes predictions on the industry turnover, measured by the fraction
iθ of novices in the industry. Each period, a fraction T (θ) of novices reveals a talent lower
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than the threshold and exits the industry, and the population of veterans (1− iθ) retires.
In equilibrium, this flow of exit must equal the flow of novices entering the industry,
implying





Proposition 3 As talent scalability s increases, earning profile steepness and dispersion
increase. Turnover in and out the industry is decreased and careers become longer on
average.
Proof. The effects of s on wage profiles comes directly from Proposition 2. Indeed,












Empirical Evidence Philippon and Reshef (2009) find that wage profiles are 2.5%
steeper and 8% more dispersed for male workers with less than five years of experience
in finance. In addition, they find that earning profiles have become relatively steeper
since the 1990s. Concerning the industry turnover, Oyer (2008) shows that careers are
persistent in the financial industry. Using the return on the S&P 500 as an instrument, he
finds that the probability that a person who starts his career in investment banking will
work there in a later year is about 50% higher than someone who starts elsewhere. This
paper provides new empirical evidence on career earning profile in the financial industry.
2.3.3 Size Prediction
Firms, taking the worker’s talent and compensation as given, adjust capital to maximize
profits. In the spirit of Rosen, adjustable capital increases and is convex in talent. In
addition, differences in adjustable capital should partly explain differences in compensa-
tion. Indeed, a veteran wage is the sum of the outside option and the output surplus he
produces relatively to the threshold worker, which increases with adjustable capital. The
correlation between wages and size should increase in talent scalability.
Proposition 4 As talent scalability s increases, the correlation between wages and ad-
justable capital increases.
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Empirical Evidence A natural proxy for size is the market value per employee at the
firm level. Starting with Roberts (1956), many empirical studies (e.g. recently Terviö
(2009), Gabaix and Landier (2008)) have documented that CEO compensation increases
with firm size. This paper extends these analytics to another market than the one of
CEOs and provides a new potential explanation for inter-industry wage differentials.
2.4 The Social Planner’s Solution
The social planner maximizes social surplus S(θ) by choosing the exit threshold θ max-
imizing total profits minus the opportunity cost of production. Total profits consists in
the sum of profits generated by first, novices, second, veterans. Let iθ denote the fraction
of novices in the industry
S(θ) = iθ(Φ(θ̂)− ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Novice Group Surplus
+ (1− iθ)E[Φ(θ)− ω|θ ≥ θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Veteran Group Surplus
(9)
Introducing (8) and differentiating (9) (detailed computations are in Appendix A), the
first order condition is
Φ(θ∗)− Φ(θ̂) = (1− T (θ∗))(E[Φs(θ)|θ ≥ θ∗]− Φs(θ∗)) (10)
The immediate loss in expected output from hiring a novice instead of an optimal
threshold veteran equals the expected future gains, assuming that the same rehiring
threshold is still used in the future.
Proposition 5 The optimal exit threshold exists, is unique, above the population mean
and above the equilibrium threshold.
Proof. The left-hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in θ, with a slope equal to
f(k)s, whereas the right-hand side is decreasing, with a slope equal to −(1−T (θ))f(k)s.
The left-hand side is equal to zero at θ∗ = θ̂ while the right hand side is equal to
E[Φs(θ)] − Φs(θmin) > 0 at θ = θmin and reaches 0 at θ = θmax. Thus there is a unique
solution to (10) in the interval [θ̂; θmax]. Proposition 1 implies that θ is in the interval
[θ̂; θ∗].
The competitive equilibrium threshold, when workers are financially constrained, is
lower than the optimal one. Consequently, some veteran workers who should not be
working in the industry do not exit once their talent is revealed. This causes first, a net




The data1 are based on a mailed survey among French graduate engineers lead by the
French Engineer and Scientist Council (IESF2 - Conseil National des Ingénieurs et des
Scientifiques de France). The IESF is a federation of 160 alumni organizations of French
engineer schools. The timespan between surveys has decreased from five years from
1983 to 1986, to one year from 2004 onwards. Until 2000 the survey is postal, in 2002
the survey is both postal and e-mailed and from 2004 on, the survey is only e-mailed.
Each participating alumni organization sends the survey to engineers they have personal
information on. Since respondents are not identified over time, these are cross-sectional
data. On average, the sample stands for nearly 6% of the total population of French
engineers and the response rate amounts to 10%. Table 1 provides summary statistics.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for the French Graduate Engineer Dataset
S1980 = Graduates from the 1983, 1986 and 1989 surveys; S1990 = 1992, 1995, 1998 surveys;
S2000 = 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 surveys. Compensation is in 2005 constant euros.
Variables S1980 S1990 S2000
Education
Percent graduated from top 1 engineer school 1.5 3 1.7
Percent graduated from top 10 engineer schools 20.6 24.9 10.6
Percent with a business degree 8.7 8.3 14
Demographics
Mean age 38.4 38.7 34.8
Percent Female 6.4 11 15.7
Percent Married 77.6 74.2 75.6
Work place
Percent working abroad 2.8 4.7 12.1
Percent working in Paris area 46.6 42.4 39.4
Career
Mean experience 14.6 14.3 11.6
Percent team manager 32.3 26.9 20.6
Percent department head 15.4 19.2 17.3
Percent top executive 6.5 9.9 7.4
Compensation
Mean yearly gross wage 62,858 63,585 57,807
90th centile 101,376 103,698 96,516
99th centile 155,454 175,603 190,414
Industry
Percent in finance 1.8 1.8 2.3
Percent in the oil sector 0 3 2.5
Percent in consulting 3.1 1.8 0.5
Number of Observations 64,396 55,976 172,537




The survey has many unique specificities. First, it provides unique wage data on the
French educational elite. 3 Second, French engineers working abroad are included, and
so individuals working in The City of London or Manhattan Financial District can be
observed. Third, information is very detailed. It can be classified into six groups: personal
data, job description, compensation level and structure, firm description, satisfaction, job
history. See Appendix C for the year 2000 survey (in French) and Appendix B for more
summary statistics on the data.
Respondents are volunteer, half of alumni organizations have taken part in the survey
4, and the survey is sent only to alumni whose name and address they have. However, I
find evidence that the selection bias is restricted. On the one hand, when I compare the
median gross wage including bonuses in the 2009 survey5 with the one computed for the
same population in a Towers Perrin survey 6, I find no significant difference. On the other
hand, I analyze the population of engineers in the 2003 French Employment Survey, for
which the sample is randomly selected, to the population of respondents in the 2003 and
2005 IESF surveys. The sample composition is close, except that engineers in the IESF
survey are younger.
I observe the yearly gross wage for employees aged more than 20 but less than 65 and in
activity. It includes variable compensation in the form of bonuses, but not stock options.
Interviewees provide exactly the gross salary declared on the tax declaration, which limits
the risk of measurement error. Because there is no information on hours worked, a hourly
wage cannot be computed. However, people declare if they work full time or not, and
if not, they provide the percentage of a full time job their part time job corresponds to.
Hence there are two possibilities: Either to reconstruct full time compensation, or to only
work on data concerning full time jobs. To limit measurement errors, the choice made
was to work only on full time employees. Hence, 10.8% of the observations are excluded. I
also exclude data that do not concern employees (unemployed or inactive), and of workers
of less than 1 year of experience. Finally, for each year I stream data in the following
way. First, I keep observations with compensation higher than the legal minimum wage.
Second, for each sector I drop compensation in the top 1% of the distribution. All nominal
quantities are converted into constant 2005euros, using the French National Price Index
3If I compare it with the French Employment Survey, from the year 2003 to 2005 there are on average
only 3,400 individuals a year graduated from a French engineer school in the French Employment Survey,
against 25,000 engineers in the IESF survey, among which 10 on average work in the financial sector,
against more than 800 in the IESF survey.
4In 2008, whereas 220 schools provided an engineer degree, only 112 alumni organizations participated
5I consider engineers working in the private sector, in companies with more than 2000 employees
(more likely to be surveyed by Towers Perrin) and with three years of experience
6Towers Perrin is a leading compensation consulting company. This survey is conducted among 79
French and foreign companies that have hired on average 500 French newly graduated in 2009.
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(IPCN) from INSEE 7.
Based on the official industry classification code provided by the respondents, I define
48 industries. This classification code is either the 2008 five-digit, the 2003 and 1993
four-digit NAF codes and the 1973 NAP codes, depending on the year of the survey. It is
equivalent to the U.S. four digit SIC code. The objective is to have a manageable number
of industries that cover most of engineer activities. Sectors are described in Appendix A.
For engineers working abroad, if the official classification code is not provided, I use the
sector they declare working in.
4 Empirical Evidence
The objective of this section is to evaluate empirically the three predictions of the model.
The first one relates the finance premium to wage dispersion, the second one to steepness
and increased variance in the wage profile and finally, the third one to size effects. Each
prediction is first tested in a cross-sectional analysis over the 2005-2010 sample, then in a
time-series analysis over the 1983-2010 sample. The finance premium and evolution since
the 1980s can be explained by talent scalability.
4.1 Cross-sectional Evidence: 2005-2010
4.1.1 The Finance Premium
Based on the IESF compensation survey, I first show that finance is the sector in which
French graduate engineers are better paid. I estimate the following wage equation over
the period 2005-2010:
wi,t = Xi,tβ + Ii,tγ +Dtα + εi,t (11)
where wi,t is the log yearly gross wage, Xi,t is a vector of individual characteristics, Ii,t
stands for the vector of industry dummies, and Dt for the vector of year dummies. εi,t
is the error term. Each industry has a dummy variable and I impose that the sum of all
the industry dummy coefficients is zero. Hence, the coefficient is the deviation from the
weighted mean of wages in other sectors.
The control variables include eight education dummies among which six are indicators
of the ranking of the engineer schools. The two other education dummies refer to double
degrees in science, and in management. Demographic controls include years of experi-
ence, experience squared, experience cubed, sex, marital status and sex × marital status.
I control for occupation with nine dummies standing for production, logistics, develop-
7Data are available at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
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ment, IT, commercialization, administration, executive, education and else. There are
five different dummies for firm type: individual firm, private sector, public firm, public
administration and others (non-governmental organization etc.), and four dummies for
firm size: less than 20 employees, from 20 to 500, from 500 to 2000, more than 2000.
Job characteristics are represented by a working in ”Ile de France” dummy (Paris area),
a working abroad dummy (together with seven country dummies for the US, UK, Ger-
many, Switzerland, Luxembourg, China and Belgium from 2004 on) and four hierarchical
responsibility dummies, from no hierarchical responsibility to chief executive.
Results are displayed in Table B.1. Finance is the industry in which French graduate
engineers are better paid, with a premium that amounts to 30%. This premium is consid-
erable: it is more than twice as high as the premium in the second highest-wage industry,
the oil one. However, it is lower than in Philippon and Reshef (2009). This difference
can be explained by, on the one hand, the homogeneity of the sample - all employees
are graduated engineers - on the other hand, the high explanatory power of the controls,
confirmed by a R-square of 72%.
4.1.2 Skewness of the Wage Distribution
Proposition 2 in the model implies that a high talent scalability leads to skewness in the
wage distribution. To test this prediction, I first draw the Lorenz curves for wages first
in finance, second in the rest of the economy. Figure 4.1.2 shows that the distribution
of wages is positively skewed in the financial sector, much more than in the rest of the
economy. I find that the top 1% of the wage distribution in the financial sector captures
8.5% of the total wage bill against 3.8% in the rest of the economy.
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Figure 1
Distribution of the Total Wage Bill by Percentiles of the Wage Distribution in the
Financial Sector
Data are from the 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 surveys. There is a total of 92,403 observations with
3,154 observations in the financial sector. Observations within the financial sector are sorted by wages
and divided into 100 groups of equal size. The total wage bill is the sum of compensation within the
financial sector. The share of the total wage bill is the sum of all wages within each group divided by
the total wage bill.
The skewness in the distribution of wages in the financial sector can not be explained
by workers’ observable characteristics. Indeed, I estimate equation (11) over the same
sample and examine the distribution of residuals for each sector. With a standard devia-
tion of residuals and a skewness statistics of respectively 0.56 and 1.6 against an average
of 0.25 and 0.8 in the rest of the economy, finance is the sector with the highest variance
and skewness in residuals. The estimate of equation (11) by quantile regressions con-
firms this result (Table B.2). The premium in finance is more than 7 times as high at
the top of the wage distribution (0.9 quantile) as at the bottom (0.1 quantile). On the
contrary, the premium in the oil industry is lower at the top than at the bottom of the
wage distribution.
4.1.3 Career Dynamics Evidence
According to Proposition 3, a high talent scalability is coupled with an increasing wage
premium and variance over career. Since data are cross-sectional, the evolution of the
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premium over an individual’s career cannot be directly estimated. However, I use infor-
mation on worker’s years of experience to divide the samples of the 2005-2010 surveys
into 5 groups: less than 2 years of experience, from 2 to 4 years, from 4 to 6, from 6
to 8 and more than 8. I then estimate equation (11) by quantile regressions over these
five different samples at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles8. Figure 4.1.3 suggests that
the premium in the financial sector increases over years of experience, which is consistent
with a talent revelation process. In addition, the increasing gap between the 25th and
the 75th percentiles supports the idea of increasing inequalities with experience.
Figure 2
Financial Sector Premium over Years of Experience at the Median, 25th and 75th
Wage Percentiles
Boxes represent the coefficient of the financial sector dummy in equation (11) estimated by quantile
regression at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles over three subsamples. The 1983-1989 sample covers
the 1983, 1986 and 1989 surveys, the 1995-2000 covers the 1995, 1998 and 2000 surveys. Finally, the
2005-2010 sample covers the 2005 to the 2010 surveys. The dependant variable is the yearly gross wage.
Each regression also controls for education, gender, marital status, occupation, firm type, firm size,
hierarchical responsibilities, working abroad, working in Paris area, experience, experience squared and
experience cubed.
A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition confirms the contribution of returns to experience
8In order to deal with composition effects, the financial sector is divided in 13 subsectors based on the
job description: analyst, asset management, back office, controller, executive, it, merger and acquisition,
project finance, quant, retail, risk management, structurer, trading. Each subsectors has a dummy
variable. The premium for working in the financial is the sum of each subsector premium weighted by
the average share of this subsector in the financial sector.
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to the finance premium. Table B.3 in Appendix displays the decomposition for the
sample of respondents of less than five years of experience. Whereas less than 30% of
the wage differential is explained by difference in observable characteristics, almost 50%
is explained by higher returns to experience.
4.1.4 Compensation Elasticity to Size
Proposition 4 relates compensation to size: as talent scalability increases, wage elasticity
to size increases. The question is: what can be used as a proxy for size? In the literature,
competition for talent has been analyzed in the market for CEOs using the firm’s total
market value (Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008)). The assumption is that a
CEO’s talent would have a permanent impact on the firms’ future earnings. But the
impact of an employee’s talent is expected to be lower. In the model it varies with first,
the amount of adjustable capital, second talent scalability. In order to build a proxy
for size, I use a key question of the 2010 survey: Interviewees are asked whether they
manage a budget and if yes, its amount. The information is provided by almost 30%
of the interviewees, which are 1.5 years more experienced than the average. Table 2
provides some summary statistics on this proxy across sectors. The distribution of the
budget variable is right skewed, with a median of 2 millions euros, versus a mean of 16.2
million euros.
Table 2 Budget per Employee in Million Euros- Summary Statistics
Sectors Mean Sd p10 p50 p90
Total Sample 16.18 47.18 0.14 2.00 35.00
Finance 20.65 42.08 0.25 5.00 60.00
Oil 15.49 39.30 0.17 3.25 27.50
Consulting 5.33 25.38 0.11 0.55 5.00
Drugs 26.11 73.03 0.20 3.00 60.00
Holding 30.02 67.01 0.30 5.00 80.00
Mining 47.57 99.50 0.54 8.00 150.00
I verify whether the budget amount is a good proxy for size, regressing the logarithm
of compensation on the logarithm of these size proxy, controlling for the same variables
as in wage equation (11).
Table 3 shows that one standard deviation increase from the mean in the budget
managed per employee has a 25% impact on compensation.
The model predicts that compensation elasticity to size varies across sector. Conse-
quently, I estimate (11) introducing interaction effects between size and industry
wi,t = c+ βXi,t + ηln(Yi,t) + γIi,t + λln(Yi,t)× Ii,t + εi,t (12)
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Table 3. Elasticity of Compensation to Size
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage.







Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
where wi,t is the log yearly gross wage, Xi,t is the vector of individual characteristics
described above, Ii,t stands for the vector of industry dummies, Yi,t the size proxy and
Dt the vector of year dummies. εi,t is the error term. I drop individuals in sectors in
which the number of observations is lower than 40. η captures the average compensation
elasticity to size, whereas λ captures the elasticity differential for each sector.
Table 4 reports the estimation of the industry coefficients first, without the interaction
terms (Model 1) then including them (Model 2). Results are consistent with the model
predictions: compensation elasticity to size is three times as high in finance as in the
rest of the economy. Moreover, size effects largely explains the finance premium (more
than 60%). To extend the analysis to other sectors, size effects also explain most of the
premium in the holding, consulting and media industries, in which jobs seem scalable.
Oppositely, elasticity to size is low in real estates, mining, and utilities.
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Table 4. Compensation Elasticity to Size
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage - Each 33 industry has a dummy variable.
The model includes a female dummy, a married dummy, a female × married dummy, a Paris area
dummy, 7 education dummies, a working abroad dummy, years of professional experience and its
square, 4 hierarchic responsibility dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 4 firm size dummies, 4 firm type
dummies.
Model 1 Model 2
Gross Differences Interaction Coef Industry Dummy Coef
Industry Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.)
Ln(Size) 0.056 (0.003) 0.053 (0.004)
Aerospace -0.08 (0.018) -0.023 (0.012) -0.056 (0.025)
Auto -0.065 (0.016) -0.019 (0.011) -0.036 (0.023)
Chemicals 0.031 (0.019) -0.006 (0.014) -0.04 (0.031)
Construction -0.113 (0.015) -0.003 (0.011) -0.11 (0.027)
Consulting 0.170 (0.026) 0.164 (0.040) 0.06 (0.035)
Drugs 0.066 (0.029) 0.002 (0.020) 0.053 (0.046)
Education -0.192 (0.068) 0.03 (0.15) -0.22 (0.11)
Electric Equipment -0.0319 (0.022) 0.031 (0.017) -0.07 (0.032)
Electricity and gas 0.096 (0.023) -0.033 (0.015) 0.17 (0.034)
Electronic -0.046 (0.016) -0.011 (0.012) -0.034 (0.023)
Engineering -0.054 (0.012) -0.021 (0.010) -0.032 (0.017)
Finance 0.320 (0.022) 0.095 (0.015) 0.108 (0.039)
Food 0.007 (0.021) 0.001 (0.015) 0.002 (0.032)
Holding 0.120 (0.021) 0.03 (0.013) 0.06 (0.035)
IT -0.019 (0.017) 0.039 (0.017) -0.07 (0.025)
Machin -0.025 (0.019) 0.011 (0.014) -0.044 (0.028)
Media 0.064 (0.038) 0.11 (0.04) -0.085 (0.062)
Metal -0.047 (0.026) 0.001 (0.02) -0.05 (0.04)
Mining 0.073 (0.035) -0.04 (0.022) 0.17 (0.065)
Misc. Services 0.087 (0.041) -0.009 (0.026) 0.09 (0.06)
Oil 0.026 (0.046) -0.06 (0.040) 0.11 (0.077)
Organization -0.079 (0.037) 0.063 (0.12) -0.15 (0.16)
Plastic -0.003 (0.028) 0.06 (0.02) -0.10 (0.04)
Public -0.040 (0.100) 0.02 (0.08) -0.07 (0.12)
Realestate -0.075 (0.048) -0.056 (0.028) 0.05 (0.08)
Ship building -0.065 (0.033) -0.04 (0.021) 0.002 (0.05)
Soap 0.075 (0.031) 0.043 (0.021) -0.008 (0.047)
Steel -0.005 (0.027) 0.005 (0.019) -0.015 (0.040)
Telecom -0.015 (0.025) -0.032 (0.02) 0.32 (0.041)
Transportation -0.037 (0.029) -0.035 (0.021) 0.024 (0.043)
Utilities -0.108 (0.035) -0.069 (0.027) 0.023 (0.059)
Wholesale 0.026 (0.018) 0.025 (0.013) -0.011 (0.029)
Observations 5,755 5,755
R2 0.72 0.73
4.2 Time-series Evidence: 1983-2010
4.2.1 The increase in the Finance Premium
The model predicts that the finance premium should increase in line with job size. The
question remains: what is a good proxy for size? Since any cross-sectional size proxy is
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not available over the whole period, I use one proxy for size in each industry. I compute
the average firm’s total market value per employee over the largest 50 firms of each sector
over the period 1982-2010, based on Compustat data for the U.S. economy. The formula
is
mktvalue = data199 ∗ abs(data25) + data6− data60− data74
All nominal quantities are converted in constant 2005 dollars, using the GDP deflator
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Sectors are defined in Appendix.
In addition, I estimate wage equation (11) over the 1983-2010 period. Detailed results
for the periods 1983-1989, 1995-2000 and 2005-2007 are presented in Table B.4. Figure
3 shows first, the average market value per employee in finance, second, the coefficients
of the finance dummy over years. The financial sector premium has increased along with
size per employee, from below 10% in the 1980s up to 33% in 2007.
Figure 3
Average Market Value per Employee in million 2005dollars in the Financial
Sector and Evolution of the Premium (1983 - 2008)
Firm size is the median market value of the top 50 firms in the U.S. financial sector in billion 2005$,
computed using Compustat. Boxes represent the coefficient of the financial sector dummy in equation
(11) estimated over each survey from 1983 to 2010 (205,585 observations). The dependent variable is
the yearly gross wage. There are 48 industry dummies, and the estimation is constrained such that the
sum of all the industry dummy coefficients is zero. Each regression also controls for education, gender,
marital status, occupation, firm type, firm size, hierarchical responsibilities, working abroad, working in
Paris area, experience, experience squared and experience cubed.
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I now estimate (11) over the sample 1983-2010 introducing interaction effects between
size and industries
wi,t = c+ βXi,t + η × ln(mktvaluej,t) + γIi,t + λ× ln(mktvaluej,t)× Ii,t + εi,t (13)
mktvaluej,t stands for the proxy for size per employee for industry j in year t. Again,
results are consistent with the model. I find that the interaction coefficient is six times
as high in finance as in the rest of the economy. In addition, the increase in the premium
from 5% in 1983 up to 33% in 2007 is totally explained by the fourfold increase in market
capitalization per employee. Once again, elasticity to size is low in the oil, utilities and
real estate industries, and high in the consulting one.
4.2.2 Increasing Wage Dispersion
In a time-series analysis, the model predicts that the rise in the finance premium should
come along with an increasing wage dispersion. Figure 4 displays quantile regression
estimates of the finance wage premia in equation (11) at the 10th, 50th and 90th per-
centile over three samples: 1983-1989, 1995-2000 and 2005-2010. For each period, wage
dispersion is captured by the difference between the 10th and 90th percentiles. It shows
that the increase in the wage premium is much higher at the 90th percentile than at the
10th or 50th percentile. In addition, the 90-50 gap has increased much more than the




Evolution of the Finance Premium at the 10th, 50th and 90th Centiles of
the Wage Distribution
Boxes represent the coefficient of the financial sector dummy in equation (11) estimated by quantile
regression at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles over three subsamples. The 1983-1989 sample covers
the 1983, 1986 and 1989 surveys, the 1995-2000 covers the 1995, 1998 and 2000 surveys. Finally, the
2005-2010 sample covers the 2005 to the 2010 surveys. The dependant variable is the yearly gross wage.
Each regression also controls for education, gender, marital status, occupation, firm type, firm size,
hierarchical responsibilities, working abroad, working in Paris area, experience, experience squared and
experience cubed.
5 Discussion
To summarize, the financial sector premium can be attributed to a high talent scalability
in an industry in which firms compete for industry-specific talent. In this section, I
discuss two other strands of theories that have been developed to explain inter-industry
wage differentials: the moral hazard and the compensating wage differential ones.
5.1 Moral Hazard and Industry Rents
In standard moral hazard models, variable compensation is used as an incentive device.
When possible, it should vary with the idiosyncratic individual performance. But when
individual performance is not observable, it could be linked to the overall firm perfor-
mance. However, relative performance measures should be favored (Holmström (1982)).
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In talent retention models, on the opposite, variable compensation increases jointly across
firms and workers to keep wages in line with workers’ outside option (Oyer 2004).
I use a specific question of the IESF survey to observe the patterns of variable com-
pensation. Interviewees are asked to provide the percentage of total compensation which
is variable from the year 2000 survey onwards. Since stock options are not included in
total compensation, the variable share includes only bonuses and firm specific incentive
schemes. I drop values higher than 80% of the total annual compensation (1% of the
sample) and lower than 0. Whereas 41% of individuals declare variable compensation in
the total economy, they are 65% in the financial sector. When I regress the probability
of declaring variable compensation over individual characteristics, I find that working in
the financial sector increases the probability by 0.11 pp. Table 4 describes the evolution
of the share of variable compensation with deciles of revenue within the financial sector
and in the rest of the economy. Deciles are computed in 2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
and 2008. It suggests that part of the premium of top wages is paid through variable
compensation, more in the financial sector than in the rest of the economy.
Table 5
Ratio of variable compensation to total compensation across wage deciles











However, I also find that variable compensation is highly correlated with bank profits.
Figure 5.1 shows that, from 2000 to 2008, they have evolved in line. This result is in favor
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Figure 5
The evolution of the variable share (in %) and profits in the financial sector (in billion of
constant euros) - 2000-2008 - Data are from the French Commission Bancaire
5.2 Compensating Wage Differential
Another potential explanation for the financial sector premium is a compensating dif-
ferential for either hard working conditions or unemployment risk. Based on the IESF
compensation survey, I can test empirically this explanation.
On the one hand, using data on job satisfaction and hours worked, I control for both
stress and workload in wage equation (11) with two dummy variables that are coded 1 if
the interviewee declares suffering from them, 0 if not. In addition, a variable indicates if
the engineers work overtime occasionally, 5 to 10 hours or more than 10 hours. I do not
find any significant downward impact of these variables on the finance premium.
On the other hand, I also control for unemployment risk using two different strategies.
First, I observe the fraction of layoffs on the total population of employees per sector
(from the 2009 labor turnover data from the French Ministery of Labor, Employment and
Health) as a measure of unemployment risk. I find that there is a negative correlation
between wages and industry unemployment risk, that from 1999 on unemployment risk
has been constant in the financial sector (layoff rate of 1.7%), and that the financial
sector is one of the sectors with the lowest layoff rate (average: 2.9%). The second
strategy consists in using a specific question of the survey asking interviewees if they
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suffer from job insecurity. Results are similar: the coefficient of this variable in the wage
equation (11) is significantly negative.
6 Conclusion
I find that the financial sector premium can be explained by talent scalability and compe-
tition for industry-specific talent. In a historical perspective, technological progress and
finance deregulation would have made skills in the financial sector more general within
the sector but more industry-specific, increasing competition for the best employees in
the sector. In addition, talent scalability has increased. This result has implications con-
cerning wage inequalities, talent allocation, risk taking and their impact on growth. It
predicts that regulating the structure of compensation in the financial sector, restricting
bonuses for example, may have no impact on the level of compensation.
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Appendix A Computations
To maximize social surplus S(θ)
S(θ) = iθ(Φ(θ̂)− ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Novice Group Surplus
+ (1− iθ)E[Φ(θ)− ω|θ ≥ θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Veteran Group Surplus
I introduce iθ =
1



































S(θ) = Φ(θ̂)− ω − E[..] + (2− T (θ))(E[..]− Φ(θ))
= Φ(θ̂)− Φ(θ) + (1− T (θ))(E[Φ(θ)|θ > θ]− Φ(θ))
Appendix B Empirical Results
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Table B.1. Estimated Inter-industry Wage Differentials: 2005-2010
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage - Each industry has a dummy variable - Decomposition in 48
sectors - The model includes a female dummy, a married dummy, a female × married dummy, a Paris area dummy, 8
education dummies, a working abroad dummy, seven country dummies, experience, experience squared and experience
cubed, 4 hierarchic responsibility dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 4 firm size dummies, 4 firm type dummies .
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Financial Sector 0.30∗∗ (0.01)
Oil Sector 0.13∗∗ (0.01)
Mining 0.13∗∗ (0.02)





Insurance Sector 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Realestate 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Miscellaneous services 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Chemical 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Drugs sector 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Wholesale trade 0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Steel and iron 0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Soap and Cosmetics 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Alcohol 0.02 (0.02)
Glass products 0.01 (0.01)
Rubber and plastic products 0.01† (0.01)
Telecommunications 0.01 (0.01)
Media 0.01 (0.01)
Ship building 0.00 (0.01)
Miscellaneous goods 0.00 (0.02)
Information technologies -0.01∗ (0.00)
Transportation -0.01 (0.01)
Car trade -0.01 (0.02)
Car industry -0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Food products -0.01∗ (0.01)
Textile sector -0.02† (0.01)
Machinery -0.03∗∗ (0.00)
Electric equipment -0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Printing -0.03 (0.02)
Non food retail -0.03∗ (0.01)
Metal industry -0.04∗∗ (0.01)




Air transport -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Public sector -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Non profit organization -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Furniture -0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Hotels and restaurants -0.06∗ (0.03)
Public utilities -0.08∗∗ (0.01)
Health sector -0.10∗∗ (0.02)
Food retail -0.14∗∗ (0.02)
Agriculture sector -0.15∗∗ (0.02)
Education sector -0.17∗∗ (0.01)
N 82229
R-squared 0.71
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table B.2. Quantile Regression - 2005-2010
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage - Each industry has a dummy variable - Decomposition in 48
sectors - 2005-2010. The model includes a female dummy, a married dummy, a female × married dummy, a Paris area
dummy, 8 education dummies, a working abroad dummy, 6 country dummies, experience level, squared and cubed, 4
hierarchic responsibility dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 4 firm size dummies, 4 firm type dummies .
0.1q 0.5q 0.9q
Industry Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.)
Aerospace 0.028∗∗ -0.011 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.014
Agriculture sector -0.122∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.085∗∗∗ -0.029
Air transport -0.033∗ -0.019 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.014 0.007 -0.024
Alcohol 0.037 -0.023 0.015 -0.017 0.038 -0.029
Car industry 0.059∗∗∗ -0.01 0.012 -0.008 -0.025∗ -0.013
Car trade 0.007 -0.024 -0.006 -0.018 -0.007 -0.031
Cement 0.027 -0.02 0.058∗∗∗ -0.015 0.182∗∗∗ -0.025
Chemical 0.089∗∗∗ -0.012 0.080∗∗∗ -0.008 0.028∗ -0.015
Construction -0.022∗∗ -0.011 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.014
Consulting 0.036∗∗∗ -0.011 0.095∗∗∗ -0.008 0.282∗∗∗ -0.014
Drugs sector 0.067∗∗∗ -0.013 0.056∗∗∗ -0.01 0.051∗∗∗ -0.016
Education sector -0.183∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.166∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.123∗∗∗ -0.023
Electric equipment 0.018 -0.012 -0.020∗∗ -0.009 -0.031∗∗ -0.015
Electricity and gas 0.123∗∗∗ -0.012 0.124∗∗∗ -0.008 0.158∗∗∗ -0.014
Electronic products 0.016 -0.01 -0.019∗∗ -0.008 -0.048∗∗∗ -0.013
Engineering -0.023∗∗ -0.01 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.026∗∗ -0.013
Financial Sector 0.099∗∗∗ -0.011 0.200∗∗∗ -0.008 0.769∗∗∗ -0.014
Food products -0.029∗∗ -0.012 -0.004 -0.008 0.017 -0.015
Food retail -0.214∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.125∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.078∗∗ -0.037
Furniture -0.002 -0.018 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.050∗∗ -0.022
Glass products 0.051∗∗∗ -0.02 0.02 -0.014 0.002 -0.025
Health sector -0.116∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.034 -0.034
Holding 0.059∗∗∗ -0.011 0.094∗∗∗ -0.008 0.183∗∗∗ -0.014
Insurance Sector 0.007 -0.016 0.043∗∗∗ -0.012 0.129∗∗∗ -0.02
Information Tech. -0.041∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.013∗ -0.007 0.042∗∗∗ -0.013
Machinery 0.019∗ -0.011 -0.01 -0.008 -0.024∗ -0.014
Media -0.025∗ -0.014 0.012 -0.01 0.072∗∗∗ -0.018
Metal industry -0.014 -0.012 -0.020∗∗ -0.009 -0.030∗ -0.015
Mining 0.088∗∗∗ -0.022 0.084∗∗∗ -0.016 0.210∗∗∗ -0.028
Miscellaneous services -0.004 -0.014 0.055∗∗∗ -0.01 0.122∗∗∗ -0.018
Miscellaneous goods 0.012 -0.022 0.002 -0.016 -0.037 -0.027
Non food retail -0.044∗∗ -0.021 0.009 -0.015 0.013 -0.026
Oil Sector 0.208∗∗∗ -0.015 0.153∗∗∗ -0.011 0.123∗∗∗ -0.019
Non profit organization -0.050∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.022
Paper 0.082∗∗∗ -0.019 0.062∗∗∗ -0.014 0.048∗∗ -0.023
Rubber 0.053∗∗∗ -0.013 0.023∗∗ -0.009 0.014 -0.016
Printing -0.019 -0.026 -0.047∗∗ -0.019 -0.008 -0.032
Public sector -0.037∗∗ -0.018 -0.048∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.012 -0.022
Realestate 0.024 -0.019 0.051∗∗∗ -0.014 0.097∗∗∗ -0.023
Hotels and restaurants -0.054 -0.035 -0.004 -0.026 -0.012 -0.044
Ship building 0.049∗∗∗ -0.015 0.011 -0.011 -0.004 -0.019
Soap and Cosmetics 0.027∗∗ -0.013 0.023∗∗ -0.009 0.028∗ -0.016
Steel and iron 0.076∗∗∗ -0.013 0.051∗∗∗ -0.01 0.025 -0.017
Telecommunications 0.011 -0.012 0.022∗∗∗ -0.008 0.058∗∗∗ -0.014
Textile sector -0.027 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 0.025 -0.022
Public utilities -0.069∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.072∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.018
Wholesale trade -0.004 -0.011 0.039∗∗∗ -0.008 0.086∗∗∗ -0.014
Transport (ref)
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Table B.3. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of the Finance Premium
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage - Each industry has a dummy variable - 2005-2010. Employees
of less than five years of experience. The model includes a female dummy, a married dummy, a female × married dummy,
a Paris area dummy, 8 education dummies, a working abroad dummy, 6 country dummies, experience level, squared and
cubed, 4 hierarchic responsibility dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 4 firm size dummies, 4 firm type dummies.





Working abroad 0.06 0.16
Experience -0.00 0.22
Paris 0.01 0.09
Top Engineer School 0.01 0.03
Prep years 0.00 0.05
Double degree in management 0.01 -0.03
Double degree in science 0.00 0.05
Team manager 0.00 0.03
Director -0.00 -0.00
Top executive -0.00 -0.00
Private sector 0.00 -0.01




Rest of the economy 24,277
R squared 0.34
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Table B.4. Finance Premium Evolution: 1983 - 2010
The dependant variable is the log of the yearly gross wage - Each industry has a dummy variable - Decomposition in 48
sectors. The model includes a female dummy, a married dummy, a female × married dummy, a Paris area dummy, 7
education dummies, a working abroad dummy, years of professional experience and its square, 4 hierarchic responsibility
dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 4 firm size dummies, 4 firm type dummies .
1986-1989 1995-2000 2005-2007
Industry Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.)
Aerospace -0.003 (0.005) -0.034 (0.008) -0.044 (0.007)
Agriculture -0.146 (0.011) -0.102 (0.022) -0.179 (0.021)
Air transportation 0.062 (0.016) 0.060 (0.017) -0.027 (0.018)
Alcohol 0.037 (0.016) -0.037 (0.031) -0.006 (0.022)
Auto 0 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005)
Carsale 0.014 (0.027) 0.116 (0.038) 0 (0.026)
Cement -0.009 (0.008) -0.008 (0.022) 0.045 (0.019)
Chemicals 0.072 (0.005) 0.089 (0.010) 0.034 (0.007)
Construction -0.028 (0.004) -0.044 (0.007) -0.068 (0.006)
Consulting - - 0.162 (0.009) 0.125 (0.006)
Drugs 0.05 (0.010) 0.096 (0.015) 0.046 (0.010)
Education -0.1 (0.021) -0.193 (0.015) -0.162 (0.015)
Electric equipment -0.056 (0.005) -0.026 (0.008) -0.033 (0.008)
Electricity and gas 0.036 (0.005) 0.062 (0.008) 0.109 (0.009)
Electronic -0.03 (0.004) -0.02 (0.005) -0.033 (0.005)
Engineering 0.021 (0.003) -0.035 (0.005) -0.04 (0.004)
Finance 0.070 (0.008) 0.157 (0.009) 0.320 (0.006)
Food products 0.015 (0.007) 0.005 (0.011) -0.022 (0.007)
Food retail -0.003 (0.027) -0.148 (0.034) -0.158 (0.026)
Furniture -0.097 (0.020) -0.053 (0.019) -0.047 (0.015)
Glass 0.009 (0.012) -0.005 (0.018) 0.012 (0.019)
Health -0.064 (0.026) -0.145 (0.024) -0.098 (0.026)
Holding 0.114 (0.018) 0.111 (0.009) 0.095 (0.007)
Insurance 0.02 (0.012) 0.054 (0.014) 0.044 (0.014)
It - - 0.013 (0.006) 0.007 (0.005)
Machin -0.012 (0.004) -0.026 (0.007) -0.033 (0.006)
Media -0.052 (0.028) -0.056 (0.026) -0.011 (0.016)
Metal -0.052 (0.006) -0.052 (0.009) -0.031 (0.009)
Mining 0.137 (0.017) 0.101 (0.021) 0.049 (0.031)
Misc. services -0.017 (0.017) 0.04 (0.015) 0.027 (0.011)
Misc. goods 0.021 (0.011) -0.023 (0.043) 0.024 (0.027)
Non food retail -0.013 (0.018) 0.001 (0.028) -0.049 (0.020)
Oil 0.168 (0.006) 0.119 (0.011) 0.138 (0.013)
Organizations - - -0.138 (0.014) -0.056 (0.015)
Paper 0.073 (0.010) 0.099 (0.013) 0.069 (0.016)
Plastic and rubber 0.001 (0.007) 0.015 (0.009) 0.015 (0.009)
Printing -0.022 (0.016) -0.045 (0.028) -0.023 (0.024)
Public adminsitration -0.095 (0.005) -0.111 (0.011) -0.057 (0.015)
Realestate 0.01 (0.012) 0.022 (0.020) 0.056 (0.017)
Restaurant and hotel -0.053 (0.034) -0.031 (0.038) -0.091 (0.037)
Ship building 0.011 (0.016) -0.015 (0.022) -0.014 (0.015)
Soap and cosmetics 0.014 (0.007) 0.028 (0.011) 0.023 (0.010)
Steel 0.042 (0.005) 0.017 (0.009) 0.024 (0.011)
Telecom -0.079 (0.010) 0.041 (0.009) 0.028 (0.008)
Textile -0.033 (0.010) -0.034 (0.015) -0.018 (0.016)
Transportation -0.005 (0.007) 0.01 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011)
Utilities 0.009 (0.012) -0.041 (0.015) -0.071 (0.012)
Wholesale 0.008 (0.006) 0.049 (0.007) 0.034 (0.006)
N 42,619 35,792 52,098
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Sectors
I use 5 digit 2008, 4 digit 2003 and 1993 NAF codes, and 1973 NAP codes to assigne engineers to 48 industries. NAF (NAP) is the French official industry classification,
 equivalent to the two digit SIC code. The following table gives the industry names and codes.   
2008 NAF 2003 NAF SIC
1 Aero Aircraft 3030Z 353A, 353B, 353C 372
Aircraft Maintenance and Repair 3316Z
2 Agriculture Crops and Livestock Production
0111-0116Z, 0119Z, 0121-0129Z, 0130Z, 0141-
0147Z, 0149Z, 0150Z, 0161-0164Z, 0170Z 011A-G, 012A-J, 013Z, 014A-Z 01, 02, 07
Forestry 0210Z, 0220Z, 0230Z, 0240Z 020A, 020B, 020D 08
Fishing 0311Z, 0312Z, 0321Z, 0322Z 050A, 050C 09
3 Air Transportation 5110Z, 5121Z 621Z, 622Z 451, 452, 458
Aircraft Rental 7735Z 712E
4 Alcoholic Beverage
1101Z, 1102A, 1102B, 1103Z, 11B04Z, 1105Z, 
1106Z, 1107A-B 159A-Q 2080, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085
Wine growing 0121Z 011G
5 Automobile and Trucks Motor vehicles 2910Z 341Z, 342B 371, 379
Car bodies 2920Z 342A
Motocycles 3091Z 354A
Motor Vehicles Equipment 2931Z, 2932Z 343Z
6 Car Sales Services and Rental Car Sales 455Z, 501Z, 502Z 551, 552, 553, 559
Car Rental 711A, 711B, 712A 751
7
Cement, Concrete and Stone 
Products 2351Z-2388Z 265A-E, 266A-L, 267Z, 268A-C
321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 
327, 328, 329
8 Chemicals Industrial Gaz 2011Z 241A
Paints 2012Z, 2030Z, 241C, 243Z
Industrial Inorganic Chems (includes nuclear) 2013A, 2013B, 2446Z 241E, 233Z 281
Industrial Organic Chems 2014Z 241G 286
Agricultural Chemicals 2015Z, 2020Z, 241J, 242Z 287
Plastic Material and Synthetic Resin and textile 2016Z, 2017Z, 2060Z 241L, 241N, 247Z 282
9 Construction Building Contractors, general and residential 4110A-D 452A-V 152, 154
Operative Builders 4120A, 4120B 453A-H 153
Heavy Construction
4211Z, 4212Z, 4213A, 4213B, 4221Z, 4222Z, 
4291Z, 4299Z 161, 162
Special Construction
4311Z, 4312A-B, 4313Z, 4321A-B, 4322A-B, 
4329A-B, 4331Z, 4332A-C, 4333Z, 4334Z, 4339Z, 
4391A-B, 4399A-E 454A-M, 451A-D 171 - 179
Equipment Rental for construction 7732Z
10 Consulting Management Consulting 7022Z 741G 874
Accounting 6920Z 741A 872
Market study 7320Z 741C 873
Law 6910Z 741E 811
Advertising Consulting 7311Z 744B 731
Public Relation 7021Z
11 Drugs Pharmaceutical Preparations 2110Z 244A 283
Drugs 2120Z 244C, 244D
12 Education Services Primary Education 8510Z, 8520Z 801Z 820 - 829
Secondary Education 8531Z, 8532Z, 8541Z 802A, 802B
Higher Education 8542Z 803Z
Other 8559A, 8559B
13 Electric Equipment Motors 2711Z, 2712Z 311A-C, 312A-B
Storage Batteries 2720Z 314Z 362
Electric Wires 2731Z, 2732Z, 2733Z 313Z 361
Lighting Equipment 2740Z 315A-C 364
Electrical Appliances 2751Z, 2752Z 297A
Other Electrical Equipment 2790Z 316A-D 369
Electrical Equipement Repair 3314Z
14 Electricity and Gas Electric Production 3511Z 401A 491
Electric Distribution 3512Z, 3513Z 401C, 401E
Gas Production 3521Z 402A 492
Gas Distribution 3522Z, 3523Z 402C 493
Steam Supply 3530Z 403Z 496
15 Electronic Equipment Chips 2611Z-2612Z 321A,321C,321D 367
Computers 2620Z 300A-300C 357
Communication Equipment 2630Z 322A,322B,323Z 366
Eectronic Goods 2640Z 332A-B, 333Z 365, 363
Measuring Systems 2651A-B, 2652Z 335Z 381, 382
Lab Analytical Instruments 2660Z 331A,331B 384
Optical Instruments 2670Z-2680Z 334A-B 385
Electronic Industry Services 3313Z, 3320C, 3320D
16 Engineering Engineering 7112A, 7112B 742B, 742C 871
Industrial Control 7120A, 7120B 743A, 743B
Research and Development 7211Z, 7219Z 731Z
Scientific Experts 7490A, 7490B
17 Finance Commercial Banks 6419Z 651C, 651D, 651E, 651F 60
Funds 6430Z
Credit 6491Z, 6492Z 652A, 652C, 652E, 652F 61
Other 6499Z
Stock Exchange 6611Z 671A 62
Portfolio Management 6612Z 671C
Fund Management 6630Z 671E
18 Food Products and tobacco Meat Products 1011Z, 1012Z, 1013A, 1013B, 1020Z 151A-F, 152Z 201 - 207
Canned Peserved Fruits and Veg 1031Z, 1032Z, 1039A, 1039B 153A-F, 152Z
Fat and Oils 1041A, 1041B, 1042Z 154A-E
Dairy Products 1051A, 1051B, 1051C, 1051D, 1052Z 155A-F
Bakery Products 1061A, 1061B, 1062Z, 1071A-D, 1072Z, 1073Z 156A-D, 158A-F
Sugar et al 1081Z, 1082Z, 1083Z 158H-P
Other Food Products 1084Z, 1085Z, 1086Z, 1089Z, 1091Z, 1092Z 158R-V 209
Non alcoholic Beverage 1107A, 1107B 159S-T 2086-2087
Tobacco 160Z 21
19 Retail Food Trade 4711A-F, 4721-29Z 521A-F 54
20 Furniture, Lumber Furniture 3101Z, 3102Z, 3103Z, 3109A, 3109B 361A-M 25
Lumber 1610A-B, 1621Z-29Z 201A-B, 202Z, 203Z, 204Z, 205A-C 24
21 Glass Products 2311Z-2349Z 261A-K, 262A-L, 264A-C, 263Z 321, 322, 323
22 Healthcare Health Services 8610Z-8690E 851A-L 80
Nursing and Social Home 8710A-8790B 853A-E
Social Services 8810A-8899B 853G-K 83
23 Holding Management Activities 741J 6420Z, 7010Z 67
24 Insurance Life Insurance 6511Z 660A 63




Relative Services 6629Z 672Z
25
Information Technology 
Services Computer Programming 6201Z 722A-C 737
Computer Consulting 6202A-B 721Z
Computer Maintenance and Repair 6203Z 725Z
Other Computer Related Services 6209Z 726Z
Data Processing 6311Z 723Z, 724Z
Computer rental 7733Z
Internet Services 6312Z
Information Related Services 6399Z
26 Machinery 2811Z-2899B 291A-300A 351-356
Machin Industry Services 3312Z, 3320A, 3320B 359
27 Entertainment and media Publishing 5811-21Z, 5821Z, 5829A-C 221A-E
Motion Picture 5911A-5914Z 921A6J 78
Music 5920Z 221G 79
Advertising Agency 7312Z 744A 731
Radio-TV Broadcaster 6010Z, 6020A-B 922A-F 483, 484
Theatre 9001Z-9004z 923A-K
28 Metal Products 2521Z-2599B 281A, 281C,282C-287Q 34
Metal products repair and maintenance 3311Z
29 Mining Metal Mining 0710Z, 0721Z, 0729Z 120Z, 131Z, 132Z 10
Non Metalic Minerals 0811Z, 0812Z, 0891Z, 0892Z, 0893Z, 0899Z 141A-E, 142A-C, 143Z, 144Z 14
Mining Relative Services 0910Z, 0990Z
30 Miscellanous Business Services Business Services 82 748A-K 733, 734, 738
Cleaning and Maintenance 81 747Z
Security and investigation 80 746Z
Job Agency 78 745A,B
31
Miscellanous Industry and 
Cosumer Goods Money 3211Z 362A 39
Jewelry 3212Z 362C, 366A
Musical Instruments 3220Z 363Z
Toys 3240Z 365Z
Sport Equipement 3230Z 364Z
Medical Equipement 3250A, 3250B
Other 3291Z, 3299Z 366C,E
32 Non Food Retail Trade 4719A-B, 4741-43Z, 4751Z-4799B 522A-P, 523A-526H 53, 56, 57
33 Oil Oil Extraction 0610Z 111Z 14
Oil Field Services 0910Z 112Z
Petroleum Refining 1920Z 232Z 29
Coking 1910Z 231Z
34 Membership Organization 86
35 Paper and Paperboard Mills 211A-C, 212A-L 26
36 Plastic and Rubber Products Rubber Products 2211Z, 2219Z 251A-E 30
Plastic Products 2221Z, 2222Z, 2223Z 252A-C
Misc Plastic Products 2229A, 2229B 252G-H
37 Printing 1811Z, 1812Z, 1813Z, 1814Z, 1820Z 221A-J, 222A-G, 223A-E 27
38 Public Administriation General Public Administration 8411Z, 8412Z, 8413Z 751A-G
Specific Administrations 8421Z-8425Z 752A-J
Welfare 8430A-C 753A-C
Cultural Activities 9101Z-9104Z 925A, 925C, 925E, 926A
39 Real Estate Real Estate Operators 6810Z, 6820A, 6820B 701A-F, 702A-C 65
Real Estate Agents and Managers 6831Z, 6832A, 6832B 703A-D
40 Hotel and eating places Hotels 5510Z-5590Z 551A, 552F 70
Eating and Drinking places 5610A-5630Z 553A-602B 58
41
Ship Building, Railroad 
Equipment and ot transp 
equipment Shipbuilding and repair 3011Z, 3012Z 351B-C-E 373
Railroad Equipment 3020Z 352Z 374
Tanks 3040Z 351A 376
Bicycles 3092Z 354C 375
Repair 3315Z, 3317Z
Other 3099Z 354E-Z 379
42 Parachemicals, Cosmetics Soap and other detergents 2041Z 245A 284
Perfumes and Cosmetics 2042Z 245C
Paints 2030Z 243Z 285
Other Chemical Products 2051Z, 2052Z, 2053Z, 2059Z
246A, 246C, 246E, 246G, 246J, 
246L
43 Steel Works etc Primary Metal Industry 2410Z, 2420Z 271Y, 271Z 33
Steel Works 2431Z-2434Z 272A-C, 273A-G
Non Ferrous Industry 2442-2445Z 274C-M
Foundries 2451Z-2454Z 275A-G
44 Telecommunications and mail Telecommunications 6110Z, 6120Z, 6130Z, 6190Z 642A, 642B, 642C 481, 482, 489
Mail 5310Z, 5320Z 641A, 641C
45 Textiles and Apparel Textile Mill Products 1310Z, 1320Z, 1330Z, 1391Z-1396Z, 1399Z
171A-P, 172A-J, 173Z, 174A-C, 
175A-G, 176Z, 177A-C, 22
Apparel and other Textile Products 1411Z-1414Z, 1419Z, 1420Z, 1431Z, 1439Z
181Z, 182A-J, 183Z, 191Z, 192Z, 
193Z 23, 24
46 Transportation Railroad Passenger Transportation 4910Z 601Z 401
Railway Freight 4920Z
Bus Transp 4931Z, 4939A-B 602A-B 41
Taxicabs 4932Z 602E, 602G
Road Freight 4941A-C, 4942Z 602L,M,N,P
Pipelines 4950Z 603Z 46
Water Transport 5010Z, 5020Z, 5030Z, 5040Z 601A-B, 612Z, 621Z, 622Z 44
Storage 5210A, 5210B
Related Services 5221Z, 5222Z
Handling 5224A-B
Freight 5229A 42
Travel Agencies 7911Z, 7912Z, 7990Z 47
47 Utilities Water Supply 3600Z, 3700Z 410Z 494
Sanitary Services
3811Z, 3812Z, 3821Z, 3822Z, 3831Z, 3832Z, 
3900Z 900A-G 495
48 Wholesale 46 50-51
14e enquête du CNISF
sur la situation socio-économique des ingénieurs
I Signalétique personnelle
II Formation d'ingénieur
1.  Êtes-vous membre de l'association des anciens élèves de votre école ?   
5.  Votre diplôme d'ingénieur a-t-il été obtenu par :   
III L'entreprise qui vous employait au 31-12-2000
9.  Secteur d'activité :
2.  Année de naissance :    19  
3.  Sexe :   ' 1 Homme   ' 2 Femme
4.  Utilisez-vous un e-mail ?   ' 1 Oui, personnel   ' 2 Oui, au bureau   ' 3 Oui, aux deux   ' 4 Non
' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non   ' 3 Il n'en existe pas
' 1 Formation initiale (de base)   ' 2 Apprentissage   ' 3 Formation continue*
(*) Si réponse 3 : Depuis combien d'années travailliez-vous quand vous avez entrepris ce diplôme ?
6.  Votre formation à l'entrée en école d'ingénieur :   
' 1 Bac (prépas intégrées)   ' 2 Classes préparatoires   
' 3 Bac + 2 ou 3 (DUT, BTS, Licence)   ' 4 Bac + 4 (Maîtrise) ou plus   ' 5 Autre
7.  Diplôme d'ingénieur :   
Première école  :  Sigle …………   Ville …………………………   Année de sortie 
Deuxième école :  Sigle …………   Ville …………………………   Année de sortie  
Reprenez les chiffres de la liste ci-dessous :   Spécialité 1  
1  Généraliste, sans spécialité dominante
2  Agronomie, sciences de la vie, agro-alimentaire
3  Chimie, génie des procédés
4  Électronique, télécommunications
5  Électrotechnique, automatique, électricité
 6  Génie civil , BTP, mines, géologie
 7  Informatique, génie logiciel, math. appliquées
 8  Mécanique, production, productique
 9  Physique, matériaux
10 Autre
' 1  Agro-alimentaire, agriculture
' 2  Industrie, énergie
' 3  BTP/construction
' 4  Sociétés de conseil, audit, études non techn.
' 5  SSII, sociétés de services informatiques
'  6  Bureaux d'études techniques, ingénierie
'  7  Finance, banque, assurance
'  8  Télécommunications
'  9  Commerce, ditribution, transport
' 10  Fonction publique : État, territoriale ou hospitalière
' 11 Autre
Spécialité 2  
8.  À l'issue de votre formation d'ingénieur, quelle était votre spécialité de sortie ?   
 Si la prochaine enquête se faisait à l'aide d'internet, y participeriez-vous ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
Travaillez-vous dans le secteur de la nouvelle économie (télécoms, e-business) ?  ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
Code APE au 31-12-2000 (ce code en 3 chiffres et une lettre figure sur vos bulletins de salaire) : 
Codes pour le CNISFCode CNISF (ne rien inscrire)
 (Ne rien inscrire



















IV Caractéristiques de votre activité principale au 31-12-2000
10.  Nature de l'entreprise au 31-12-2000   
' 1  Travailleur indépendant   
' 2  Secteur privé
' 3  Secteur nationalisé, d'économie mixte, EPIC   
' 4  État, collectivités locales, autre secteur public
' 1  Informatique industrielle   
' 2  Informatique des systèmes et réseaux
' 3  Informatique des systèmes d'information   
' 4  Internet
11.  Taille de l'entreprise (nombre de salariés) au 31-12-2000   
15.  Situation professionnelle au 31-12-2000 (choix unique)   
16.  Temps partiel.  Si cette activité est à temps partiel, indiquez-en le pourcentage : 
17.  Activité dominante au 31-12-2000 
18.  Si vous êtes informaticien, est-ce dans le domaine de : 
12.  Lieu de travail (indiquez : le numéro à 2 chiffres du département ; DOM : 97 ; TOM : 98 ; étranger : 99)
13.  Pour l'étranger : indiquez le code postal international (D, CH, UK, USA…)
14. S'agit-il d'une entreprise que vous avez créée ?   ' 1 Oui   Ou d'une reprise ?   ' 2 Oui
' 1  Pas de salarié   
' 2  1 à 20 salariés
Depuis combien d'années Dans quel secteur d'activité (cf. les codes d'activité de la question 9)
' 3  21 à 499 salariés   
' 4  500 à 4 999 salariés
' 5  5 000 salariés et plus
3  Études, recherche, projets :
' 3.1  Recherche fondamentale
' 3.2  Recherche, essais, développement
' 3.3  Projet, ingénierie, études techniques
' 3.4  Conseil, audit, études non techniques
' 3.5  Management de projets techniques
4  Informatique, systèmes d'information, réseaux :
' 4.1  Exploitation, production
' 4.2  Études, projets et développement
' 4.3  Administration, maintenance, support
' 4.4  Technico-commercial, commercial, marketing
5  Technico-commercial, marketing, vente :
' 5.1  Technico-commercial (sauf informatique)
' 5.2  Commercial, vente, marketing (sauf informatique)
' 1  Production, fabrication, chantiers
' 2  Approvisionnement, logistique, qualité, sécurité,
   organisation, maintenance, environnement…
'  6  Administration des entreprises : finances, juridique,
   communication, ressources humaines…
'  7  Direction générale
'  8  Administration dans la Fonction publique
'  9  Enseignement, formation
' 10  Autre
' 1  Fonctionnaire
' 2  Salarié en contrat à durée indéterminée
' 3  Salarié en contrat à durée déterminée
' 4  Salarié à employeurs multiples
' 5  Intérim, vacations ou contrat précaire
' 6  CSN
'  7  Travailleur indépendant
'  8  Gérant ou dirigeant majoritaire
'  9  Contrat lié à une thèse : CIFRE, ATER…
' 10  Demandeur d'emploi
' 11  Pré-retraité ou retraité
' 12 Autre (étudiant, congé sans solde, service national…)














V Ressources professionnelles en 2000
VI Parcours professionnel
VII Réduction du temps de travail (RTT)
19.  Niveau hiérarchique au 31-12-2000   
' 1  Pas encore cadre   
' 2  Cadre sans responsabilité hiérarchique
' 3  Responsable d'une équipe
' 4  Responsable d'un service ou d'un département
' 5  Directeur de fonction centrale, d'établissement,
    de division, de branche
' 6  PDG ou DG
' 1  Réduction quotidienne   
' 2  Réduction par 1/2 journées ou journées sur une courte durée
' 3  Des jours de congés supplémentaires
' 4  Mise en place d'un Compte épargne temps
' 5  Modulation, annualisation   
' 6  Autre modalité
' 7  Non concerné (cadre dirigeant)
' 8  Autres
' 1  Une réduction de votre durée hebdomadaire de travail ; ' 2  Une réduction de votre nombre de jours de travail
22.  Revenu professionnel brut annuel 2000 (en kF) :
31.  Estimez-vous que, pour vous, la RTT se traduit réellement par : 
20.  Nombre de salariés sous votre responsabilité hiérarchique :
21. Si vous n'êtes pas dans la ligne hiérarchique, avez-vous un titre professionnel (expert…)
   conféré par votre entreprise ?   ' 1 Oui    ' 2 Non
Sur ce total, quel pourcentage représente la part variable : 
Combien d'emplois avez-vous occupés au total depuis que vous êtes ingénieur ? 
Dans combien d'établissements au total ?
Il s'agit du revenu complet lié à l'activité que vous venez de décrire, primes et avantages en nature compris. 
Si vous n'avez pas travaillé à temps plein ou toute l'année, merci de calculer le revenu en équivalent année pleine.
Indiquez vos trois derniers emplois caractérisés par une activité dominante et un niveau hiérarchique.
23.  Bénéficiez-vous en outre de stock-options ?   ' 1 Oui    ' 2 Non
24.  Revenu professionnel brut annuel 1999 (pour rappel) :
25. Revenu professionnel brut annuel prévisible pour 2001 (en kF) :
29.  La RTT a-t-elle été mise en place dans votre entreprise ?   ' 1 Oui    ' 2 Non    ' 3 Ne sait pas
30.  Que comporte l'accord de RTT pour vous (plusieurs réponses possibles) :
32.  Êtes-vous satisfait de ces modalités ?   ' 1 Oui    ' 2 Non
26.  En quelle année avez-vous commencé à travailler comme ingénieur ?
27.  Nombre d'années d'ancienneté. Dans l'entreprise :
28.  Parcours professionnel :

























(utilisez les codes de Q17)
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VIII Travail à l'étranger (hors CSN)
IX Renseignements complémentaires
42.  Combien de semaines avez-vous passé hors de France en 2000 :   
33.  Quand vous avez quitté la France pour la 1re fois, quelles étaient vos motivations ?   
38.  Quel était votre statut ?   
34.  Quel a été le premier pays étranger où vous avez travaillé (indiquez le code postal international) :
35.  S'agissait-il aussi de votre premier emploi ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
36.  Depuis que vous êtes ingénieur, combien de mois avez-vous travaillé à l'étranger ?
37.  Le cas échéant, votre conjoint(e) travaille-t-il (elle) à l'étranger ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
39.  Depuis combien de mois travaillez-vous dans ce pays ?
40.  Combien de temps encore pensez-vous travailler à l'étranger ?
41.  Travaillez-vous pour une entreprise française ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
43.  Vivez-vous en couple ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
44.  Votre conjoint(e) a-t-il (elle) une activité professionnelle ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
45. Combien d'enfants vivent dans votre foyer ? 
Rôle déterminant   Rôle accessoire   Aucun rôle(Choix multiples possibles)
' 1  Salarié du privé sous contrat local
' 2  Salarié du privé de droit français
' 3  Contrat de chantier ou CDD
' 4  Fonctionnaire international ou français
' 5  Fonctionnaire local
' 6  Travailleur indépendant
' 7  Bénévole
' 8  Autre : ………………………………
46.  Lorsque vous avez commencé vos études d'ingénieur, quelle était la profession de vos parents ?   
' 1  Cadre ou profession intellectuelle supérieure
' 2  Profession intermédiaire 
   (technicien, instituteur, contremaître)
' 3  Employé
' 4  Ouvrier
' 5  Travailleur indépendant
' 6  Autre (retraité…)
' 1  Cadre ou profession intellectuelle supérieure
' 2  Profession intermédiaire 
   (technicien, institutrice, infirmière)
' 3  Employée
' 4  Ouvrière
' 5  Travailleuse indépendante
' 6  Autre (femme au foyer, retraitée…)
père mère
'   Si vous résidez en France, faites-vous des déplacements à l'étranger ?   ' 1 Oui   ' 2 Non
'   Si vous travailliez à l'étranger au 31-12-2000 (hors CSN) :
années (si vous ne savez pas, notez 99)
 1  Liens familiaux, personnels ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 2  Perfectionner la langue ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 3  Déroulement de carrière, demande de l'employeur ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 4  Vous n'avez pas trouvé de travail en France ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 5  Création d'entreprise plus facile ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 6  Après un stage durant vos études ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 7  Après un séjour en coopération (VSN, CSN) ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 8  Poursuite d'étude ou post doc ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
 9  Niveau de rémunération plus élevé ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
10 Recherche de dépaysement, autre culture ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
11 Recherche d'autonomie dans le travail ' 1 ' 2 ' 3
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Non-Exclusive Competition and the Debt
Structure of Small Firms
Claire Célérier1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium debt structure of small firms when competi-
tion between lenders is non exclusive. Lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts,
the borrower can accept more than one of them, and the set of contracts that is
accepted is not observed. Two categories of lenders compete: banks that monitor
their borrowers, and uninformed lenders. The monitoring technology alleviates the
moral hazard problem but induces a fixed cost. I find that the equilibrium debt
structure of small firms depends on their initial wealth: poorly-capitalized ones are
only offered expensive loans by uninformed lenders. Richer ones can be financed at a
lower price by banks. The fraction of the loan offered by the lead bank, the interest
rate that is charged, and the sum of lenders’ profits decrease with the borrower’s
initial wealth.




Understanding the financial choices of small firms is key in corporate finance. How-
ever, the literature has mostly focused on firms that are already well established. In
the U.S., entrepreneurs are increasingly relying on credit cards to finance their busi-
nesses. The National Small Business Association reports that in December 2009, 49
percent of small business owners were using credit cards to finance their firms. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994), based on data from the Small Business Survey, show that
firms first use relatively cheap sources of financing when available, and then resort
to more expensive informal credits. The objective of this paper is to address the fol-
lowing question: Why do small firms largely rely on expensive informal finance such
that credit cards or trade loans? This paper starts from the assumption that there
is a fixed cost to be monitored by traditional banks. Consequently, small firms are
financed through informal loans. But informal lenders may lack of information on
the borrowing patterns of these small firms: they cannot observe the set of contracts
accepted by the borrower and ensure that there is no multiple contracting. In the
presence of moral hazard, this problem of non exclusivity can lead to inefficiencies
and rents.
There is ample evidence that non exclusivity is prevalent in credit markets.
Consumers and small firms typically hold several credit cards and are often given
incentives to open new accounts. More generally, exclusivity clauses are rare in debt
contracts, and information sharing does not exist for small firms in most countries.
This paper presents an incentive model of non exclusive competition in which the
strategic interactions between lenders affect the borrower’s financing choices. Non
exclusivity refers to the borrower’s ability to accept more than one loan offer without
lenders observing the set of contracts that is accepted.
Non exclusive competition combined with moral hazard can generate externali-
ties. Consider that a borrower’s unobservable effort can impact the return to a loan
and that the cost of this effort is increasing with the loan amount. In this case,
any lender must consider other lenders’ offers as they can mitigate the borrower’s
incentive to exert effort. This restricts quantities offered and so, the Bertrand com-
petition mechanism does not work. For example, if the borrower is better off taking
twice the first best loan amount and shirking rather than investing the first best
amount and exerting effort, competition between two lenders cannot generate the
first best level of investment.
In this model, two categories of lenders compete: monitoring and non monitoring
ones. The monitoring technology alleviates the moral hazard problem, but induces a
fixed cost: the minimum investment required in branch network, human capital, and
relationship building. For simplicity, the variable cost of monitoring is normalized
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to 0. Non monitoring lenders consist mainly in credit card issuers/informal lenders.
Monitoring ones are traditional banks. One of the contributions of the paper is to
explain financing choices under non exclusive competition between bank loans and
uninformed finance.
Monitoring has two opposite effects on borrowers’ surplus. On the one hand, it
reduces incentives to shirk and hence increases debt capacity. On the other hand,
it is costly, which lowers borrowers’ payoff in case of success. Since the cost of
monitoring is fixed, access to monitored finance depends on the borrower’s self-
financing capacity. I find that as the latter increases, the use of traditional bank
loans increases whereas interest rates decrease.
When competition is non-exclusive, in the presence of moral hazard, equilibria
with positive profits for active lenders arise Parlour and Rajan (2001). To alleviate
the moral hazard problem, borrowers can either invest some of their own capital
or turn to financial intermediaries. As in Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997) monitoring
is a partial substitute for self-financing, and it increases borrower’s debt capacity.
However, departing from Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997), in this model monitoring
affects the competitive game between lenders. With monitoring, the distribution of
surplus varies in favor of borrowers and lenders’ profits decrease.
Monitoring also affects the borrower’s debt structure. By assumption, monitor-
ing decreases a borrower’s incentives to shirk in any of his loan relationships. Hence,
his project can be financed first, by a traditional bank then, by uninformed lenders.
However, to ensure that the borrower takes the loan with monitoring, the bank loan
should be large enough, so that the borrower surplus is higher taking this contract
and paying the fixed monitoring cost than accepting only non monitoring contracts.
In other words, given that the set of loans accepted by the borrower is not observ-
able, the monitoring lender is forced to retain a larger share of the loan when the
borrowers require more intense due diligence to be sure that he is not going to free
ride on the monitoring lender’s offer. This has the following key empirical impli-
cation: the lead bank finances a larger portion of the project when moral hazard
increases.
This paper is related to two disjoint bodies of literature. The first one analyzes
the consequences of non exclusive relationships under moral hazard. This litera-
ture has been pioneered by Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Kahn and Mookherjee
(1998). They consider that agents take their contractual decisions sequentially.
More recently, Parlour and Rajan (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002) and Attar
et al. (2011) have focused on models of competition in which intermediaries post
their offers simultaneously. The second one focuses on the role of lenders as delegated
monitors. This literature uses the term monitoring with three different meanings.
Ex ante, monitoring can refer to lenders’ activity of screening out ”bad” loan ap-
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plicants (see for instance Broecker (1990)). During the realization of a project, it
may consist in preventing the borrower’s opportunistic behavior (see, for instance,
Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Ex post, monitoring refers to lenders’ activity of
auditing borrowers who failed to meet contractual obligations (see, for instance,
Diamond (1984)). As in Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997), I assume that monitoring
reduces borrower’s benefit of shirking.
This paper extends from Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997) in two directions. First,
it models the financing choices of small firms. Whereas in Hölmstrom and Tirole
(1997) poorly capitalized firms have no access to the credit market, in this paper
the latter can have access to ”uninformed loans”. This result is in line with Robb
and Robinson (2009) who find that small firms in the U.S. have a large access to
external finance. Second, in this model monitoring and non monitoring lenders
compete and competition is non exclusive, which implies new results in terms of the
cost of borrowing, the debt structure, and latent contracts.
The next section develops the basic model. The case of exclusivity is described
in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium of the model under non exclusive
competition. Empirical implications are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 The Basic Model
The model has two types of agents: borrowers and lenders. Both are risk neutral
and borrowers are protected by limited liability. There are three periods. At time
1 lenders offer simultaneously loan contracts. At time 2, each borrower chooses
a subset of offered contracts and makes an investment decision. At time 3, cash
flows are realized and payments are made. The analysis focuses on subgame-perfect
equilibria in which lenders play pure strategies.
2.1 Borrowers
Each borrower can invest in a project of variable size I that yields a verifiable return
of either G (I) in case of success or 0 in case of failure. The function G : R+ → R+
is increasing and strictly concave in I, and satisfies the Inada conditions.
The probability of success of the project is affected by an unobservable effort of
the borrower e, e = {H,L}. Let pe denote the probability of success depending on
the level of effort. I assume that pH = p > 0 and pL is normalized to 0.
When a borrower chooses e = L, he enjoys a private benefit BI. This pri-
vate benefit implies an opportunity cost of providing effort. I make the following
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assumption
Assumption 1 The investment project has a positive net present value if and only
if the borrower selects e = H:
pG(I)− I > 0 > BI − I
There is a continuum of borrowers with initial wealth A. If A < I the borrower
needs to borrow at least I − A. A is observable to all lenders.
A contract has the following structure: (i) because of the borrower’s limited
liability, neither lenders nor the borrower are paid if the investment fails; (ii) if the
project succeeds, the borrower pays R > 0 to lenders; (iii) if the project succeeds,
the borrower receives G(I)−R. Therefore, a borrower’s expected utility is:
UA (I, R, e) =
{
p(G(I)−R)− A if e = H
BI − A if e = L
2.2 Lenders
There are two types of lenders: uninformed lenders and intermediaries. Uninformed
lenders include financial institutions offering unmonitored personnel loans or credit
card firms. They are considered as uninformed since they do no monitor borrowers.
Intermediaries are endowed with a monitoring technology that alleviates the moral
hazard problem.
Both types of lenders compete with each other by simultaneously offering loan
contracts denoted Cu for uninformed lenders, and Cm for intermediaries, where
Ci = (Li, Ri) ∈ R2
where Li is the loan amount and Ri is the promised repayment.
2.2.1 Uninformed Lenders
An uninformed lender i’s expected utility is:
Vu (Li, Ri, e) =
{
pRi − Li if e = H
−Li if e = L
}
2.2.2 Intermediaries
Intermediaries offer contracts with monitoring. The function of monitoring is to
reduce the borrower’s opportunity cost of being diligent from BI to bI. This mon-
itoring technology involves a fixed cost c, and a variable cost that is normalized to
0.
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Given that monitoring does not increase the probability of success, for a given
loan amount, the borrower will always prefer not to be monitored and receive a
private benefit B rather than b. Hence, monitoring must allow more capital to be
raised. Therefore, the monitoring technology is coupled with a loan contract and
intermediaries always invest in the project.
An intermediary i’s expected utility is:
Vm (Li, Ri, e) =
{
pRi − Li − c if e = H
−Li − c if e = L
}
3 The Case of Exclusivity
This section describes the impact of monitoring in the standard framework of ex-
clusive competition.
3.1 Uninformed Finance
This section analyzes the possibility of financing a project without monitoring. First,
suppose that there is no moral hazard problem, i.e. B = 0. In this case, the borrower
is offered the contract C∗ = (L∗;R∗) such that L∗ = I∗−A and R∗ = I∗−A
p
where I∗
is the first best level of investment. I∗ maximizes the total surplus from production,
implying I∗ = arg maxI{pG (I)− I}. The first order condition is
pG′ (I∗) = 1
Now consider that the borrower receives a private benefit B > 0 from shirking
and let Îu denote the level of investment. Îu maximizes the borrower’s surplus,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
p(G(I)−R) ≥ BI
Hence, the borrower must be paid at least BI
p
in case of success. A necessary and
sufficient condition for the lender to earn non-negative profits is
pR− I + A ≥ 0
The lender’s participation constraint is binding. Therefore, the borrower exerts
effort if and only if
















Assumption 2 is satisfied if B is large enough, i.e. BI∗ > pG(I∗) − I∗. It simply
states that any borrower cannot achieve the first best level of investment without
some amount of self finance.







− IuA + A = 0
Borrowers with A < A∗u invest I
u









Proposition 1 In the standard case of exclusivity, the investment level is the second
best level of investment I = ÎuA such that
• Borrowers with A ≥ A∗u invest ÎuA = I∗
• Borrowers with A < A∗u invest ÎuA = IuA
• Uninformed lenders earn zero profit whereas the borrower’s surplus is maxi-
mized subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
3.2 Monitoring
Monitoring reduces the benefit from shirking from BI to bI at a fixed cost c, and




And the participation constraint of a single intermediary is
pR ≥ I − A+ c













We make the following assumption
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Assumption 3
bI∗ + c < BI∗
Assumption 3 simply implies that A∗m < A
∗
u. Only borrowers with A ≥ A∗m can
achieve the first best level of investment with monitoring.







− ImA + A− c = 0
ImA exists if A high enough. Indeed, a minimum level of wealth Am is required
to convince intermediaries to finance the project
Am = min{A|∃I ≥ 0 s.t. A = bI + c+ I − pG(I)}
I make the following assumption
Assumption 4
Am ≥ 0
Assumption 3 states that any project cannot be financed by intermediaries with-
out a minimum amount of own capital. It is satisfied if for any I ≥ 0
pG(I)− I < bI + c





At the second best, repayment is
R̂mA =
ImA − A+ c
p
Proposition 2 In the standard case of exclusivity, when one lender monitors, the
investment level is ÎmA such that
• Borrowers with A ≥ A∗m invest ÎmA = I∗
• Borrowers with Am ≤ A ≤ A∗m invest ÎmA = ImA
• Borrowers with A < Am cannot be financed by intermediaries, implying ÎmA = 0
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3.3 Debt Structure
Monitoring is socially valuable only if the surplus generated from alleviating the
moral hazard problem is higher than the monitoring cost c. Let S(A) define the
monitoring surplus
S(A) = pG(ÎmA )− ÎmA − c︸ ︷︷ ︸






Production surplus without monitoring
I prove that the monitoring surplus S(A) is decreasing in A in the interval [Am;A
∗
u]
(Proof of Proposition 3). In addition, S(Am) > 0 and S(A
∗
u) < 0. As a result, there
exists a unique Au, with Am ≤ Au ≤ A∗u such that
S(Au) = 0




This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 3 In the standard case of exclusivity, borrowers fall into three cate-
gories
1. Borrowers with A ≥ Au invest without the help of monitoring. If A ≥ A∗u,
they achieve the first best level of investment without monitoring.
2. Borrowers with Am ≤ A ≤ Au invest with the help of monitoring. If A ≥ A∗m
they achieve the first best level of investment with monitoring.
3. Poorly-capitalized borrowers, with A ≤ Am, cannot invest with the help of
monitoring since they cannot convince intermediaries to finance the project.
They achieve the second best level of investment without monitoring.
Proof. Let demonstrate first that S(A) is a decreasing function of A. If A ≥ A∗u,
the first best can be financed by uninformed lenders, and so S(A) = −c. If
A∗m ≤ A < A∗u, the competitive allocation with monitoring is the first best level of
investment, whereas the competitive allocation without monitoring is constrained
and is increasing in A. Therefore, S(A) is decreasing in A. If Am ≤ A ≤ A∗m, the
first best cannot be financed neither with nor without monitoring. B > b implies
that ÎuA increases at a higher rate than Î
m
A . In addition, due to G concavity, if Î
m
A −ÎuA
decreases, the difference in net present value decreases even more. And so S(A) is
decreasing in the interval [Am;A
∗
u]. In addition, S(Am) > 0 and S(A
∗
u) = −c < 0.
As a result, there exists a unique Au, with Am ≤ Au ≤ A∗u such that S(A) = 0
Figure 2 summarizes the results. Compared to Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997) in
this model any firm can be financed with external funds. However, only a fraction
of them can have access to intermediate finance.
Figure 2
Firm Debt Structure - Exclusive Competition
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4 Non Exclusive Competition
This section describes the competitive game when competition is non exclusive.
4.1 The Competitive Game
The competitive game unfolds as follows. At time 1, lenders compete by offering
non-exclusive loan contracts. At time 2, each borrower can simultaneously accept
more than one offer. Let CO = (LO, RO) denote the set of all contracts offered and
CA = (LA, RA) the set of all contracts accepted. The size of the investment for a
borrower with initial wealth A is
I = LA + A
A lender is active if his contract is accepted, latent if not.
In equilibrium, lenders offer profit maximizing contracts given the moral hazard
problem and the strategy of other lenders. In turn, the consumer accepts an optimal
set of contracts and decides to exert effort or not.
In this model, moral hazard is severe; the borrower’s surplus in case of low effort
is strictly increasing in I. This has the important implication that if the borrower
decides to exert low effort, the strategy of accepting all offered contracts is optimal.
Hence, he ultimately chooses between two options:
• To accept a subset of offered contracts and exert high effort (LA ≤ LO), or
• To accept all contracts and exert low effort (LA = LO)
Assumption 1 implies that in any equilibrium, the borrower exerts high effort.
Hence, under non exclusive competition, the borrower’s incentive compatibility con-
straint is
p(G(LA + A)−RA) ≥ B(LO + A)
In addition, since the total surplus from production is decreasing if I > I∗, the
level of investment is at most I∗.
Finally, note that monitoring reduces the borrower’s opportunity cost of being
diligent from BI to bI for all his loan relationships. Therefore, the fixed cost of
monitoring implies that only one lender monitors.
Lemma 1 Under non exclusive competition, any equilibrium has the following prop-
erties
1. The aggregate contract accepted LA verifies LA ≤ I∗ − A where I∗ is the first
best level of investment.
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2. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint without monitoring is
p(G(LA + A)−RA) ≥ B(LO + A)
3. There is at most one active lender that monitors
Proof. By contradiction, assume that LA ≥ I∗−A. Hence, the level of investment
I verifies I ≥ I∗. If I > I∗, the total surplus from production pG(I) − I is strictly
decreasing. Consequently, reducing the size of the investment results in an increase
in the surplus. So, the aggregate contract accepted is at most LA = I∗ − A, where
I∗ is the first best level of investment.
4.2 Poorly Capitalized Borrowers
This section characterizes equilibria in which borrowers are financed only through
non monitoring loans. It concerns poorly-capitalized borrowers, with A < Am, for
which the cost of the monitoring technology is too high (Proposition 2). Since Am <
A∗u, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and the aggregate amount
offered LO is at most the second best ÎuA − A. Indeed, if I ≥ ÎuA the borrower will
be better off taking all contracts and shirking.
Furthermore, in any equilibrium allocation with poorly capitalized borrowers i)
there is no latent contracts, ii) the incentive compatibility constraint is binding and
iii) lenders get positive profits.
Consider first the set of offered contracts LO. A latent lender, whose offer is
not taken, can reduce the offered loan amount and the repayment so that the bor-
rower accepts his offer. The incentive to shirk is decreasing with the aggregate loan
amount, and so the borrower behaves. Since I ≤ ÎuA, the production surplus is
increasing in I, and this deviation is profitable.
Second, suppose by contradiction that the incentive constraint is not binding.
Any active lender has an incentive to deviate: he can increase the total loan amount
and keep the borrower’s surplus constant until the incentive constraint is binding.
Since the borrower is indifferent he will accept the offered contract, and behave. In
addition, since I < I∗ the total surplus from production is increasing in I, and so









Finally, suppose that there exists an equilibrium allocation in which lenders
get zero profit. In such an allocation I = ÎuA since the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding. If I = ÎuA, any decrease in the level of investment has a
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. Therefore, any equiproportional decrease in the level of investment
and the borrower’s payoff will increase profits without inducing default and so, an
active lender has always an incentive to deviate.
With poorly capitalized borrowers, if moral hazard is severe enough and if a
lender is offering that maximizes its profits, the monopolist contract, no inactive
lender can compete without inducing shirking: the borrower will be better off ac-
cepting both contracts and shirking. Since the incumbent lender maximizes its
profit, he has no incentive to deviate. Therefore, an equilibrium can emerge with a
unique active lender offering a monopolist contract.
Proposition 4 If the borrower is poorly-capitalized, i.e. if A < Am, in any equilib-
rium
1. The total amount of debt offered is at most the second best level of investment
ÎuA
2. There is no monitoring
3. There is no zero profit equilibrium. A credit allocation maximizing lenders’
profits can even emerge in equilibrium
4. There is either a unique active lender, or N symmetric active lenders
Proof. See in Appendix
4.3 Intermediate Borrowers
Intermediate borrowers, with Am < A < Am, can invest with the help of monitoring,
but cannot achieve the competitive allocation with monitoring. Two equilibria can
emerge: a monopoly allocation with monitoring and a limit pricing equilibrium, in
which the offered loan amount is the first best whereas lenders get positive profits
that are limited by the presence of competing latent contracts.
4.3.1 Monopoly Allocation with monitoring
If the initial wealth of the borrower is high enough, i.e. if A > Am then the borrower
can be financed with monitoring. However, if Am < A < A
∗
m the aggregate amount
offered LO is at most the second best ÎmA −A. Indeed, since if I = ÎmA the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, if I ≥ ÎmA the borrower is better off taking all
contracts and shirking.
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Lemma 2 The total amount of debt offered LO to intermediate borrowers, with
Am < A < A
∗
m, is at most the second best level of investment Î
m
A − A.
Therefore, the offered loan amount is constrained to be lower than the first best
level, and so in any equilibrium allocation i) there is no latent contracts, ii) the
incentive compatibility constraint is binding and iii) lenders get positive profits iv)
an allocation maximizing lenders’ profit can emerge in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 With intermediate borrowers, if Am < A < A
∗
m, there exists an
equilibrium with the following properties
1. The investment level is rationed and equal to the amount a single monopolist
would offer
2. The borrower is monitored
3. There is a unique active lender
4. The credit allocation maximizes the lender’s profit subject to the borrower’s
incentive compatibility constraint
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3.2 Limit Pricing Equilibrium with Monitoring
Let consider borrowers with A > A∗m. In that case, the offered loan amount is
L ≥ I∗. Indeed, assume by contradiction that there is an equilibrium such that
LO < I∗. In this case, there is no latent contracts, because a latent lender could
always decrease the total loan amount and interest rates such that his contract is
accepted. Indeed, the surplus from production will decrease at a lower rate than the
benefit from shirking, and so it will no induce shirking. In addition, the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding. If not, an active lender has always an incentive
to deviate by increasing the total loan amount and keeping the borrower’s surplus
constant until the incentive constraint is binding. I show that an active lender has
always an incentive to deviate and so this allocation cannot be considered as an
equilibrium. This leads to the following proposition
Let Am denote the wealth threshold above which two intermediaries can com-
pete offering the first best with monitoring without inducing shirking. Each lender
observe A, and offers the contract (I∗ − A; I∗−A
p
). If the borrower takes only one
contract and behaves, his payoff is
pG(I∗)− I∗ − c
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In contrast, the borrower can choose to take both contracts and shirk. His payoff
becomes:
b(2I∗ − A)− A
Hence, the borrower behaves if and only if





(2bI∗ − pG(I∗) + I∗ + c)
Therefore, if A∗m < A < Am, two intermediaries cannot compete offering first best
contracts without inducing shirking.
If A∗m < A < Am a limit pricing equilibrium can emerge. In this equilibrium
an active lender offers the first best level of investment, and a latent lender offers a
zero-profit contract such that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. The
interest rate charged by the active lender is such that the borrower is indifferent
between accepting its contract, or the contract from the uninformed lender. The
active lender cannot deviate by increasing rents without his offer being rejected in
favor of the inactive lender’s one, the inactive lender cannot increase or decrease the
loan amount without inducing shirking and, finally, any contract offered by a third
uninformed lender would induce shirking.
Proposition 6 With intermediate borrowers, if A∗m < A < Am, there exists an
equilibrium with the following properties
1. The investment amount is the first best I∗
2. The borrower is monitored
3. Profits are positive




Borrowers with Am < A < Au can have access to the competitive allocation with
monitoring. Indeed, by definition, Am is high enough to relax the constraint on
quantities in the competition game: two lenders can compete offering the first best
level of investment without inducing shirking.
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Let α denote the fraction of the investment financed by the lead monitoring
lender. Uninformed lenders offer contracts knowing that the borrower is going to be
monitored. However, since the borrower’s benefit from shirking is higher without
monitoring, the latter has an incentive to take all contracts from uninformed lenders
and shirk. Consequently, the fraction of the loan offered by the lead bank satisfies
pG(I)− I − c+ A ≥ bI(1− α)
α ≥ 1− 1
bI
(pG(I)− I − c+ A)
When A increases α decreases.
Proposition 7 If the borrower is well-capitalized, with Am < A < Au, there is a
unique equilibrium such that
1. The investment level is the first best I∗
2. The borrower is monitored
3. Lenders earn zero profits
4. There may be multiple active lenders and the fraction of the loan offered by
the lead one is decreasing in the borrowers’ initial wealth
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3
Firm Debt Structure - Non Exclusive Competition
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5 Empirical Implications
The model makes the following empirical predictions on the debt structure of small
businesses.
Sources of borrowing
Proposition 4 predicts that poorly-capitalized borrowers will have access to ex-
ternal finance, but not to monitoring. They can be financed by ”informal lenders”:
credit cards, family or trade loans. Proposition 5, 6 and 7 imply that intermediately
and well-capitalized borrowers can be financed with traditional bank loans.
Cost of Capital
Proposition 4 and 5 predict that small firms are charged non competitive in-
terest rates. Lenders’ rents decrease with the financing capacity of the borrower.
Proposition 7, on the contrary, predict that well-capitalized firms can have access
to zero-profit loans.
Multiple contracting
Proposition 4 predicts that multiple symmetric contracting emerge with poorly-
capitalized borrowers. Proposition 5 and 6 imply that intermediately-capitalized
borrowers are financed mainly by a unique monitoring bank. Concerning well-
capitalized borrowers, Proposition 7 states that the fraction of the loan amount
retained by the lead bank is decreasing with the firm financing capacity.
6 Data
The objective is to test the empirical implications of our model with the National
Survey of Small Business Finance Data. This survey collects information on small
businesses in the United States by interview. The information collected includes the
use of financial services among which credit cards. The survey is available for the
years 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4
If the borrower is poorly capitalized, i.e. if A < Am, in any equilibrium
1. LO ≤ ÎuA
By definition, A < Am ⇒ A < A∗m and Assumption 3 implies that A∗m < A∗u.
Consequently, ÎuA = I
u
A.
2. There is no monitoring
By definition of Am, A < Am implies that for any I ≥ 0
A < bI + c+ I − pG(I)
and so, a contract with monitoring cannot be offered without inducing shirking.
3.a. There is no zero profit equilibrium
By contradiction, assume that there exists a zero profit equilibrium. I show that
an active lender, unique or not, has always an incentive to deviate, which contradicts
the assumption.
First, consider any lender i offering L > 0. If there is no other active lender
j 6= i offering L′ > 0, lender i will offer the monopolist contract (LuM , RuM) and
hence deviate. A unique active lender has always an incentive to deviate
Suppose now that in addition to lender i offering L > 0 there exists at least one
other active lender j 6= i offering (L′, R′), with L′ > 0.




. Since IO ≤ ÎuA, this implies
L+ L′ ≤ IuA − A
⇒ L′ + A < IuA
This implies:
B(L′ + A) < pG (L′ + A)− L′
Introducing I ′ = L′ + A, we have:
BI ′ − A < pG (I ′)− I ′
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Since pG (I ′)−I ′ is increasing on the interval [0; I∗], there exists ε > 0 such that:{
pG (I ′)− I ′ < pG (I ′ + ε)− (I ′ + ε)
B (I ′ + ε)− A < pG (I ′ + ε)− (I ′ + ε)
Therefore, there exists δ > 0, such that:






is a profitable deviation for lender i, which contradicts
the premise that there exists a zero-profit equilibrium.
3b. An allocation maximizing lenders’ profits can emerge as an equi-
librium





out monitoring. This allocation maximizes the lender’s profit when the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, an so a unique active lender offering this alloca-
tion has no incentive to deviate. IuM verifies




− I + A}
which implies G′(IuM) =
1+B
p





. An inactive lender has two
options.
First, the inactive lender can offer a contract (L′, R′) accepted in conjunction





























However, the necessary condition for this deviation to be profitable is R′ ≥ L′
p
.
Therefore, this deviation cannot be profitable without inducing shirking.
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Second, the deviating lender can offer a contract (L′, R′) that is preferred to the
monopolist one. The borrower’s incentive constraint is
p (G(L′ + A)−R′) ≥ B(L′ + IuM)
And the deviating lender’s profit π′
π′ = pR′ − L′ (1)




[pG(L′)−B(L′ + IuM)] (2)
Introducing (2) and differentiating (1), the FOC is
G′(L′ + A) =
1 +B
p
This implies L′ + A = IuM . This deviation neither is profitable if and only if
pG(IuM)−B(2IuM − A)− IuM − A ≥ 0
Therefore, if moral hazard is severe enough, this deviation neither is profitable.
4. There is either a unique active lender, or N symmetric lenders
First, at any equilibrium allocation, the borrower’s surplus is such that the in-









I show that any active lender has a profitable deviation. Let Ci = (Li, Ri) be
the equilibrium offer of an active lender i, and suppose he deviates offering the
contract C ′i =
(










−i) the aggregate contract accepted by the borrower in equilibrium




























Therefore, since the net present value is increasing in ε for I + ε < I∗, the borrower
has an incentive to accept contract C ′i. Let L̄ = L
O −LA denote the aggregate loan
amount offered by latent lenders. Following this deviation, the borrower strictly





































The function G’s concavity implies:
G
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LA + A+ L̄
)
−RA > 0














Hence, the offer C ′i is accepted and the borrower exerts effort. In addition, the








− (Li + ε) = pRi − Li + pε2 > pRi − Li
Second, at any equilibrium allocation, I show that there is no latent contract.








G(LA + A+ Li)−RA −Ri
)
Suppose that i deviates offering the contract (ε; ε
p








> B(LO + A− Li + ε)
As a result the borrower will accept the contract and exert effort. Therefore, this is
a profitable deviation for lender i.
Third, at any positive profit equilibrium, excluding monopoly profit ones, the
borrower must be indifferent between accepting N or N − 1 contracts whatever the
contract that is not taken
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Let consider a positive profit equilibrium with a unique lender ⇒ monopoly
allocation.
Let consider a positive profit equilibrium with N active lenders offering contracts
Ci = (Li, Ri) for i = 1....N . The borrower’s surplus is the one at which the incentive
compatibility constraint is binding and there is no latent contracts. The borrower’s
surplus is higher than at the monopoly profit allocation if and only if:
LA + A > IuM
For this allocation to be an equilibrium, no lender should have an incentive to
deviate. We show that a lender has no incentive to deviate only if the borrower is
indifferent between taking N or N − 1 contracts, whatever the deviating one.




that this is a profitable deviation (a), that except if the borrower is indifferent
between taking N or N − 1 contracts, whatever the deviating one, he is going to
accept the contract (b), without shirking (c).
(a). This is a profitable deviation for lender i if the borrower takes the contract
and exerts high effort. Indeed, let πi and π
′
i be respectively lender i’s profit when
the contracts i and i
′







− Ii + ε
πi′ = πi + ε2
So the contract i′ is a profitable deviation for lender i if the borrower accepts it and
behaves.
(b). Now we show under which conditions the borrower accept the contract.




−i) the aggregate contract that is accepted exclusing
the contract Ci. We consider three cases covering all possibilities.










In this case, the borrower would never have taken contract i at equilibrium, which
contradicts the first assumption.















− pRA−i ≤ pG
(
LA + A− ε
)
− pRA + ε− ε2
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As a result, the borrower is better off accepting the deviating contract.










In this case only we cannot find an ε small enough such that the borrower is going
to take the offer.
(c). Second, we show that if the borrower accepts the deviating contract he be-
haves. If it were an equilibirum for the borrower to accept CA, then from Proposition










Let C ′A = (I
A ′, RA ′) be the aggregte offer after the deviation. We know that IA >
Im, as a result, for ε small enough, we also have IA ′ > Im. As on the interval















− pRA ′ > B




Hence, the contract (I ′i, R
′
i) is accepted and the borrower exerts high effort.
As a result, lender i has an incentive to deviate and the allocation such that
IA > Im is not an equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Same demonstration as in proposition 4, except that due to the monitoring technol-
ogy, there is no symmetric equilibrium since only one lender monitors. Therefore,
the unique equilibrium is the monopolist one.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Let define the function F such that F (L) = p(G(L+A))−L−b(L+I∗). By definition,
for any A < Am − pc, (I∗ − A) < 0. There exists Al such that F (ImM − A) = 0. I
show that for any A, Al < A < Am, there exists an equilibrium in which lender i
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offers the contract (I∗ − A; I∗−A−c
p




) that is not taken where L′ and λ verify:
F (L′) = 0 (5)
λ = p(G(I∗))− I∗ + A− c− pG(L′ + A)− L′ (6)
No deviation for the latent lender.
Suppose that lender j decreases the loan amount. The borrower’s payoff from
accepting contract j is strictly less than pG(L′+A)−L′, which can be obtained by
accepting and repaying contract i alone. Hence, contract j is not accepted. Sup-
pose now that j increases the loan amount he offers. Since L′ > ImM the benefit from
shirking increases at a higher rate than the production surplus. Hence, the borrower
will accept both contract and shirk. Consequently, there is no profitable deviation
for lender j.
No deviation for the active lender.
Lender i can not increase or decrease the loan amount without his contract be-
ing rejected, since the surplus is maximized at I∗. In addition, he cannot increase
interest rates since the borrower’s surplus must be at least the one he gets accepting
contract j.
No deviation for any inactive lender.
Any contract that would be preferred must offer a payoff of at least pG(L′)−L′
to the borrower; However, in this case, the borrower will be better off taking the
three contracts and shirking.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Consider lender i offering the following contract (I∗ − A, I∗−A+c
p
) with monitoring.
No deviation for any latent lender.
An inactive lender cannot offer a contract that will be strictly preferred to the
one offered by lender i, since it maximizes the borrower payoff.
No deviation for the active lender.
Suppose that lender i deviates offering a contract
(





another lender can offer the following contract with monitoring to compete
(







This contract will be strictly preferred by the borrower without inducing shirking,
since 2BI∗ < pG(I∗)− I∗ + A. Therefor, lender’s i deviation is not profitable.
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What Drives Financial Innovation? A Look into the
European Retail Structured Products Market
Claire Célérier, Boris Vallée ∗
Abstract
Complexity has dramatically increased in the market of retail financial products over the
last twenty years. What drives this innovation in retail finance? We focus on the market
of retail structured products to answer this question.
Using an academically unexploited database that gathers detailed information on all
the retail structured products sold on the European market since 1996, we first develop
two complementary measures of product complexity. They both exhibit an increasing
trend over time. We then argue that complexity is used as a differentiating tool by banks
to inflate investor expectations and limit competition. Evidence of strategic structur-
ing and higher complexity in the most competitive markets empirically comforts this
hypothesis.





Complexity has dramatically increased in the market of retail financial products over
the last twenty years. Innovative products have constantly been introduced, famously
in the mutual fund and the credit card industries. In the meanwhile, financial literacy
and sophistication seems to remain low (Lusardi et al. (2009), Lusardi et al. (2010)).
What drives this financial innovation in retail finance? Complexity may add value for
households, for instance by completing product offers and thus markets, or by optimally
and automatically implementing certain financial decisions. However it could also have
negative effects, by increasing search costs and/or strategically exploiting consumer low
financial literacy. To answer this research question, we focus on a specific market that has
met phenomenal growth and innovation in the last decade: the retail structured products
market. We establish two complementary measures of products complexity, that we apply
to an exhaustive data base of all the retail structured products that have been sold in
Europe since inception 15 years ago. We subsequently develop and test a theoretical
framework to explain the observed increase in complexity.
Rationale for studying the market of retail structured products is strong. First, its
economic significance is high: in Europe alone it represents more than EUR700bn assets
under management and is growing fast. More generally passive strategy funds are the
fastest growing segment of household finance and the development of the structured
retail market is part of this global trend in asset management. For example, Exchange
Traded Funds have now reached $1.5 trillion of assets under management, catching up
with hedge funds. Second, consumer disclosure and protection is key in this market,
as information asymmetry is maximal between innovators, investment banks structuring
the products, and the final consumer, the mass-market retail investor. The former must
reconcile two simultaneous objectives: addressing customers demand while maximizing
its profit. The latter may face limited rationality when processing information on the
complex products. This potentially leads to exploiting customers’ behavioral biases/low
sophistication. Third, some structured products seem well suited for pension savings, as
they offer exposure to stock markets while guaranteeing a minimum capital at maturity.
They may play an increasing role in this market. Fourth, the organization of supply in
this market is of key interest in itself. The entity in charge of structuring the products
is distinct from the one in charge of its commercialization. This creates potential agency
issues. This organizational structure is widespread in financial instruments markets,
such as traditional asset management. Finally this market illustrates a major public
policy issue: individual financial decisions are becoming increasingly complex, meanwhile
financial literacy/sophistication has made little to no progress.
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Our empirical analysis is largely based on a lexicographic analysis of a data set that
gathers detailed information on all retail structured products that have been sold in Eu-
rope since market inception (1996). This market represents more than 700 billion euros
in Europe, which stands for 2% of total financial savings in the continent. This database
has several unique critical advantages characteristics one looks for in any empirical indus-
trial organization study. It covers 18 countries and 16 years of data. A detailed pay-off
descriptive, information on providers and volume sold are available at issuance level. We
develop a simple algorithm to precisely identify and analyze payoff structures for all prod-
ucts. In addition, this academically unexploited data set has been matched with data
on providers (Bankscope), macroeconomic data (World Bank), and market conditions
(Datastream).
This paper offers two innovative and complementary measures for apprehending the
structure and dynamics of the retail structured product market. The first one, based on
the lexicographic analysis, takes the provider point of view. It builds a decision algorithm
describing the required steps in developing a structured retail product: in addition to the
choice of an underlying and a primary payoff structure a product provider mandatorily
faces, 7 types of exotic features can be added, ranging from early maturity option to path
dependant ones. This algorithm allows to classify products along a tree like structure,
and to measure their complexity by capturing features piling. The second approach takes
the retail investor point of view. Indeed, for the latter, product complexity cannot be
reduced to the number of payoff features a formula combines. It also depends on how
tractable each feature is, and how the product marketing and the underlying type have
been chosen. Based on the behavioral literature, we define an exhaustive list of cognitive
biases that retail structured products fit, and we match each product to a subset of these
biases. Both measures of complexity show the same increasing trend over time.
This paper subsequently formulates and tests a theoretical framework for the observed
complexity in the structured retail products market. Under this hypothesis, providers
add complexity to inflate investors’ expectations about product performance, exploiting
their low financial literacy and behavioral biases. Competition increases banks incentive
to develop complexity for obfuscation and differentiation purpose. Two alternative hy-
potheses may challenge this explanation. The first one, ”Market Completeness”, presents
product complexity as a way to complete markets. Structured retail products would be
increasingly complex to better fit consumer demand thanks to lower structuring costs
and financial innovation. The second one, ”Learning Reset”, considers a dynamic re-
lationship between complexity and consumers sophistication. Investors learn to assess
products, but innovation ”resets” this learning, keeping the fraction of unsophisticated
investors low enough to capture rents from them.
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We test direct implications from our main hypothesis and its alternatives on our
dataset. First, we show that banks time the market when adding specific features to
the products they offer. For example some features are more relevant to inflate investor
expectations when volatility is high. At the extreme, retail structured products may be
used by banks to offload some risks from their books. These results reject the ”market
completeness hypothesis”: complexity improves banks welfare at the expense of retail
investors’ one. Second, using the number of competitor at the country level, we find that
complexity increases as competition increases. Third, we find that products distributed
by private banks are more complex than products targeted at less wealthy clients, which
challenges the ”Learning Reset” alternative while comforting our research hypothesis. A
next step will be to test whether mark-ups increase with complexity. We will use Monte-
Carlo simulations to estimate the mark-ups on a representative subset of products.
Theoretical literature has tried to answer the following question: Why complexity
does not decrease when competition increases? Two papers show how inefficient prod-
uct complexity may emerge in equilibrium, whatever the competitive pressure: Ellison
(2005) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In these models, firms offer products to two
categories of investors: ”sophisticated” and ”unsophisticated” ones. In equilibrium, only
unsophisticated investors buy the complex products. By providing clear information a
firm would only attract sophisticated investors (Ellison (2005)), or decrease the fraction
of unsophisticated investors (Gabaix and Laibson (2006)) and so reduce markups. To ac-
count for the increase in complexity in financial products, Carlin (2009) and Carlin and
Manso (2011) develop models in which the fraction of unsophisticated investors is endoge-
nous and increases with product complexity. In Carlin (2009), if competition intensifies,
the probability to capture a sophisticated investor decreases, whereas the probability to
capture an unsophisticated investor is constant, since they choose products randomly.
Consequently, when competition increases, incentives to increase product complexity in-
crease. In Carlin and Manso (2011), financial institutions capture relatively higher rents
from unsophisticated investors. However, in a dynamic learning process, the fraction
of unsophisticated investors decreases. Banks face a trade-off between incurring a fixed
cost for innovating and thus reset learning, and decreasing future rents extracted from
unsophisticated investors. Our paper is the first one to test empirically implications from
these models.
Hens and Rieger (2008) show that the most represented structured products do not
bring additional utility to investors in a rational framework, which theoretically rejects
the ”Market Completeness” alternative hypothesis. We aim at validating empirically this
conclusion.
Our project also complements the literature on the role of financial literacy in con-
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sumer financial choices and bank strategies. It analyzes how the supply of structured
products may fit cognitive biases for marketing purposes, or select investors along their
financial sophistication. Bucks and Pence (2008) and Bergstresser and Beshears (2010)
explore the relationship between cognitive ability and mortgage choice. Lusardi and Tu-
fano (2008) find that people with low financial literacy are more likely to have problems
with debt. Finally, our work builds on recent interest in the role of financial interme-
diaries in providing product recommendations to potentially uninformed consumers (
Anagol and Cole (2011)).
Empirical papers on the market of structured retail products focused so far on the
pricing of specific products. Henderson and Pearson (2011), on the basis of a detailed
analysis of 64 issues of popular retail structured products, identify overpricing by banks
of almost 8%. Our paper further develops knowledge of this market providing a compre-
hensive analysis of its dynamics of innovation.
2 Background: The Market of Retail Structured -
Products
Structured retail products (SRP) regroup any investment products marketed to retail
investors whose payoff is determined following a formula defined ex-ante. They leave no
place for discretionary investment decision along the life of the investment. We exclude
pay-offs that are a linear function of a given underlying performance, e.g. ETFs. SRP are
typically structured with embedded options. Although they largely rely on equities, the
exposure one can achieve with them is very broad: commodities, fixed income or other
alternative underlyings, with some example of products even linked to the Soccer World
Cup results.
Below is an example of a product commercialized by Banque Postale (French Post
office Bank) in 2010:
Vivango is a 6-year maturity product whose final payoff is linked to a basket of
18 shares (largest companies by market capitalization within the Eurostoxx50).
Every year, the average performance of the three best-performing shares in
the basket, compared to their initial levels is recorded. These three shares are
then removed from the basket for subsequent calculations. At maturity, the
product offers guaranteed capital of 100%, plus 70% of the average of these
performances recorded annually throughout the investment period.
This illustrates the current gap between the complexity of a popular structured product
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and the level of financial of sophistication of the average client of Banque Postale. The
biased underlying dynamic selection and the averaging of performance across time makes
the product complex to assess in terms of expected performance.
The market of SRP has emerged in 1996 and has been steadily growing from then
on. In 2011, SRP assets under management stand for 700 billion euros in Europe, which
is nearly 3% of all European financial savings. Europe, with a share of global assets
under management of 64%, is clearly the biggest market. However, the US and Asia are
catching up, with markets developing now faster. Regulation, as well as higher access to
stock markets by US retail investors could explain the difference in market development
between the two continents. The growth of this market has been fostered by an increasing
demand for passive products, as active management added value has become challenged
(Jensen (1968); Grinblatt and Titman (1994)) on one side, and the profitability of these
products for the banks structuring and distributing them, on the other side Henderson
and Pearson (2011). Indeed on top of disclosed fees, some profits are hidden in the payoff
structure that is hedged at better conditions than offered to investor. In addition, SRP
can offer a funding alternative for some banks, and a way to get rid-off of some category
of risks through the sale of options included in the payoff structure.
Market structure of SRP is interesting in itself. Since these products are very complex
to structure, only large investment banks have the exotic trading platform it requires.
On the other hand, distribution is diverse. Consequently, products distributors are often
distinct from banks structuring them. These products have been marketed by a large
range of financial institutions from commercial banks, saving banks and insurance, to
wealth management and private banking. Many providers market themselves on their
expertise in structuring whereas they do not actually structure the product themselves
but only select them and implement a back to back transaction with an entity that can
manage the market risk.
Finally, another key aspect of this market is the regulation framework. European
regulators, grouped in the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), have
kept a keen eye for protecting retail investors. They developed a regulatory framework
defined by the UCITSs directives. However, until 2010, they mainly focused on disclosure
requirements, which may have amplified asymmetry issues by providing too abundant or
technical information to clients. Regulators have traditionally been reluctant to limit pay-
off innovations. This approach is starting to change: the UCITS 4 directive, implemented
in July 2011, simplifies the key information document addressed to retail investors. In




Our ”raw” data consists mainly in a commercial database that gathers detailed informa-
tion on all products that have been sold in Europe since market inception (1996). We
only look at tranche products, i.e. having a limited offer period, usually 4 to 8 weeks,
and a maturity date, as they have the largest investor base. For these products, in Oc-
tober 2011, volume and numbers of outstanding tranche products were respectively of
EUR 660bn [TBC] and 47,012 in Europe. Data are available for 18 countries in Europe.
Cumulated volumes per country since market inception are given in Table 1. Italy, Spain,
Germany, France and Switzerland dominate the market in terms of volume sold, totaling
more than 65% of total volume sold. This issuance data has been matched with informa-
tion on providers (Bankscope and manual collection), market conditions (Datastream)
and macro-economic country variables (World Bank) at the time of issuance.
INSERT TABLE 1
Since inception, 15 years ago, the market of retail structured products has met two
major trends: volume sold has exploded (Figure 1) and number of distributors has sig-
nificantly increased (from 68 in 2000 to 193 in 2010) (Table 2).
INSERT FIGURE 1
INSERT TABLE 2
The number of competitors has significantly increased over time. New entrants are
diverse: from High Street Institutions to independent financial firms. However 20 major
groups capture half of the market in terms of number of issuance (Table 3).
INSERT TABLE 3
4 Measuring Complexity
This section develops two complementary measures to apprehend the structure and dy-
namics of the retail structured product market. This is key to 1) identifying whether
there is a complexity trend 2) explaining complexity and its dynamics.
The first measure breaks down and classifies all pay-off structures along a tree-like
algorithm. It corresponds to the decision strategy a provider faces when structuring a
product. The second one matches each product with a set of exploited behavioral biases
to determine how difficult it is for the investor to fairly assess it.
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4.1 Classifying Pay-offs and Measuring their Complexity
A high diversity in pay-off formula is observed across SRP products, each one being poten-
tially unique. To overcome this challenge, we exploit pay-off information from our dataset
with a lexicographic approach. Each product description is scanned by an algorithm that
lookq for combinations of given group of words (see appendix for examples).
The objective is to pinpoint the exact combination of payoff features for each product,
based on an exhaustive list of all the possible choices. It allows us to 1) classify products
in a relevant manner, to account for pay-off features piling 2) quantify how complex each
product is. Horizontally classifying products would not allow capturing offer diversity.
The decomposition tree (Figure 2) illustrates the algorithm that we developed to
apprehend exhaustively the design of each product. It has two levels: three mandatory
stages, and four optional ones. At each node, features representing less than 1% have
been aggregated into the category ”other feature”. For each product the underlying,
and the primary pay-off structure must be defined. On top of that, pay-off formula can
include an exotic condition, a secondary pay-off structure, an underlying selection feature
and an early redemption feature. With each node offering on average five branches more
than 70,000 distinct classes of products can be identified through this algorithm. Our
dataset exhibits more than 1500 of them.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Table 4 shows statistics for each nodes of the tree over time. The fraction of call
products has decreased over time, from 63% in 2002 down to 21% in 2010, whereas
coupon products share has increased. Optional features have been increasingly added
from 2002 to 2010.
INSERT TABLE 4
Finally, Table 5 reports summary statistics on the total number of features per prod-
uct. Capital protected and non private banking products exhibit less optional features.
In addition, the number of payoff features has increased over time. More importantly Fig




4.2 Quantifying behavioral biases use
From the investor point of view, a single pay-off can be more complex than the sum of
several others. Indeed, complexity does not only result from the combination of multiple
pay-off features, but also from how tractable each feature is, and how the product mar-
keting and the underlying type have been chosen. Our assigned objective is to develop a
second complexity measure that accounts for these caveats, by quantifying how hard it
is for the investor to fairly assess the product performance.
A large body of the literature has shown how behavioral biases influence investment
decisions and can account for mispricing. We build on this literature to analyze the
strategic use of specific behavioral biases in our data.
Behavioral biases can be divided into three categories: the ones that arise when people
form beliefs, the ones that determine people’s preferences, and the ones that impact their
decision making. Since we concentrate on passive strategy products, we will only focus
on the two first categories of biases. The objective is to draw an exhaustive list of the
behavioral biases that are potentially included in the literature and that could be included
in the design of structured financial products. The higher the number of behavioral bias
the product fits, the more complex it is for the investor to fairly assess the product. We
define our second measure of complexity by the number of investor biases that a given
product exploits.
Table 6 lists the biases relevant to our study, their definition and references, and the
features that allow associating them with a given issuance.
INSERT TABLE 6
This complexity measure exhibits a similar trend to the number of pay-off features:




The robustness of the complexity proxies is tested using the number of characters included
in the payoff description.
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5 Explaining Complexity
We have established in the previous section that the market for structured retail products
exhibits an increasing complexity. This section develops our main research hypothesis for
explaining the increase in complexity, as well as two alternative ones.
5.1 Differentiating Complexity
Complexity inflates investors’ expectation about product performance, which
allows overpricing
Payoff features inflate investors’ expectation about product performance by fitting
their behavioral biases. Inflated investors expectations lead to a complexity premium
that is captured by the bank (lower ex ante rate of return than what should be offered),
creating a strong incentive for the bank to innovate and increase complexity.
Prediction 1 In a cross-sectional analysis, markups should increase with complexity.
In addition, ”strategic structuring”, defined as timing market conditions to maximize
expectations inflation, should be observed.
The role of Competition
Under a Bertrand framework, competition should lower price for comparable complex
products, or lead to the introduction of simpler and cheaper products. However, banks
have a strong incentive to maintain or develop complexity in a competitive market to
differentiate their offer and maintain their margin. Complex payoff features follow a
differentiation rationale. They typically vary across products, thus inhibiting product
comparison. Perloff and Salop (1985), among others, show that product differentiation
can lead to positive markups if consumers face random taste shocks. Gabaix and Vries
(2010) extend this result in a random utility model. They interpret noise as evaluation
errors by the consumer regarding the true value of product. By diversifying products,
producers can increase this noise, thus affecting consumer choice and market equilibrium
toward less competitive pressure. If the kurtosis in taste shocks is high enough then
markups and differentiation increase as the number of firms in the industry increases.
Prediction 2 As competition increases, product complexity and more importantly het-
erogeneity increases, as new payoff features are introduced to add some product differen-
tiation and maintain markups
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5.2 Alternative 1: Market Completeness
The increasing complexity of retail structured products may reflect a better
fit to consumer demand thanks to lower structuring costs and new products
development.
Before the end of the 1990s retail investors’ access to options was almost inexistent.
Even today, trading options, especially in short position, remains difficult for individ-
ual investors. The emergence of retail structured products would have helped complete
markets for retail investors. The large sample of complex products may therefore cater
investor demand for market completeness. However, developing new structured products
is costly. It requires innovative pricing and trading tools that have been only progressively
developed since the end of the 1990s by the main investment banks. At the distribution
level, sales force training also take some time and efforts Hence, the increasing complex-
ity in the market for retail structured products would reflect an improving fit to retail
investor need for sophisticated financial products thanks to structuring innovation. This
”Market Completeness” hypothesis offers the following cross sectional prediction. Adding
payoff features is costly, and its benefit stands in diversify a portfolio already invested
in traditional assets. Therefore financial products should be more complex for ”high net
worth” individuals,. In addition, each new payoff feature should be introduced first to
this category of investors. ”Low type” investors, oppositely, would have access to new
payoff features only when they become less costly.
Prediction 3 In a cross sectional analysis, as complexity increases, markups on complex
products should keep constant
Prediction 4 The introduction of new payoff features should improve the utility of in-
vestors, by allowing to gain a new exposure, by having different pay-off structure better
matching utility curve, etc.
Prediction 5 The sample of offers should increase in diversity while complexity in-
creases. More simple products should not disappear, as they allow cheap access to in-
teresting exposure.
5.3 Alternative 2: Learning Reset
Product complexity increases search/processing costs. Investors learn, but
adding new payoff features (”innovation resets”) keeps the fraction of unso-
phisticated investors low enough.
Investor sophistication has lagged far behind the growing complexity of financial prod-
ucts. With low sophistication, investors may have high search costs. A number of papers
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have developed models in which consumer search costs affect market efficiency and firm
profits. If we consider two categories of investors, sophisticated and unsophisticated ones,
a fairly reasonable assumption would be that firms captures higher rents from low sophis-
ticated ones. Carlin and Manso (2011) develop a dynamic model of strategic obfuscation
in retail financial markets. In this model, the fraction of sophisticated investors increases
over time through learning. However, the provider can introduce new financial prod-
ucts with complex attributes in order to ”refresh” the population of investors. In this
case, the fraction of sophisticated investors is reset at its initial level. In this model,
providers face a tradeoff between the fixed cost of adding complexity and the extra rents
gained from unsophisticated investors. As the rent that is gained from unsophisticated
investors increases, price obfuscation increases. A first implication deals with the rela-
tionship between provider types and product complexity: low type providers should offer
more complex products. Concerning the role of competition, the model predicts that as
competition increases, expected rents from low sophisticated investors decrease, and so
obfuscation decreases. Indeed, unsophisticated investors buy products from any provider
chosen randomly. This strong assumption cancels a new entrant incentive to attract only
sophisticated investors. (Weak part of the model: it works better without free entry)
Prediction 6 In a cross sectional analysis, markups would increase with complexity
Strategic structuring should be observed (lower cost of complexity)
Prediction 7 In a time series analysis, innovative payoff features are introduced when
profitability/ provider market shares decrease (due to learning).
Prediction 8 In a cross country analysis, as competition increases, price obfuscation
should decrease
6 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results validating our research hypothesis. We provide
evidence that banks use complexity to inflate investors’ expectations and show how com-
plexity is an increasing function of competition. We also rejects our two alternative
hypotheses by showing that 1) product offer is largely driven by factors exogenous to




We test whether products are structured in order to inflate investors’ expectation using
market conditions at the time of issuance. Indeed inflating expectations is made easier
by given market conditions, e.g. high implied volatility or recent under-performance.
Implied volatility is of key interest. Investors are usually unaware/indifferent towards it,
while it has a significant impact on product pricing. We use the implicit volatility index
(VIX) as an explanatory variable in our test.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of issuance of two types of products: reverse con-
vertible and call products. They are respectively the most represented ”long volatility”
and ”short volatility” products in our sample. Call products are based on the purchase
of call option, which are more expensive when volatility is high. Reverse convertible are
implicitly selling a call option, therefore offering subjectively more attractive levels when
implicit volatility is high if investor keep its volatility estimate constant. We observe a de-
crease in the fraction of call products and an increase of reverse convertible just after the
hike of implicit volatility in August 2008. Moreover call products are capital-guaranteed,
whereas reverse convertible are not. Issuance evolution is therefore unlikely to be driven
by higher loss aversion following the crisis, and appear to be timing the market.
INSERT FIGURE 4
Using several Probit specifications, we estimate the impact of implicit volatility on
the use of ”short volatility” features, controlling for interest rate levels. The propensity
of providers to sell reverse convertible and capped products increase when volatility in-
crease, which confirms our initial observation that banks strategically structure products
to inflate investor expectations.
INSERT TABLE 8
6.2 Complexity and Competition
An important implication of the research hypothesis is that competition has a positive im-
pact on complexity as it allows product differentiation to limit comparison. The following
equation is estimated:
Complexity = f(NCompetitorsi,t, T erm,G,Dt) (1)
Where Complexity is the complexity measure, NCompetitorsi,t the number of competi-
tors in the SRP market in country i and year t, Dt stands for year dummies. Finally,
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we also control for the product term and capital guarantee, with respectively term the
length in years and G a dummy with value 1 if the capital is 100% guaranteed.
Table 9 shows that both measures of complexity are indeed positively correlated with
competition intensity, even controlling for year fixed effects. It validates our research
hypothesis, while rejecting an important implication of our second alternative.
INSERT TABLE 9
6.3 Financial Literacy
Assuming that investors in private banks are more sophisticated than in commercial and
savings ones, we introduce a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the provider is a private
bank, 0 if not. Regressing the complexity measures on this variable, we establish that
products targeted at wealthy investors are more complex than the ones for standard retail
investors. It backs up our research hypothesis as a higher complexity should be needed to
confuse more sophisticated investors. It also challenges our second alternative. However
a more precise identification of the dynamic should be found.
INSERT TABLE 10
6.4 Next Step: Mark-ups and Complexity
We aims at testing whether markups increase when complexity increases. Using Monte-
Carlo simulation we will calculate ex ante mark ups for a representative sub-sample of
our products, and regress them on complexity measures.
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Equity (Single Index) In frequency order: Eurostoxx50, FTSE100, SP500, DAX, Ibex35, OMSX30,
Nikkei225, CAC40, BRIC40
Equity (Single Stock) In frequency order: Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Daimler, Zurich Finance,
Roche, Abb, BASF, UBS, Siemens, Allianz, Nestle
Commodity Physical commodities such as energy products, metals or agricultural products.
In frequency order: gold, brent, electricity, silver, corn
Foreign Exchange In frequency order: Euro/USD, PLN/Euro, CSK/Euro, CHF/Euro
Credit Default The risk of default of a company or a country
Interest Rates In frequency order: Euribor, Libor, Swap rate
Other Inflation, Funds etc.
Step 2: Primary Structure
Altiplano The product offers a capital return of 100%, plus a series of fixed coupons on
each sub periods if the underlying is above a predefined barrier.
Floater The product offers a capital return of 100% plus a series of coupons that rise
when the underlying reference rate rises.
Pure Income The product offers a capital return of 100% plus a series of fixed coupons.
Digital The product offers a capital return of 100%, plus a fixed coupon paid at ma-
turity if the underlying is above a predefined barrier.
Call The product offers a capital return of 100% plus a fixed participation in the
rise of the underlying.
Put The product offers a capital return of 100% plus a fixed participation in the
absolute value of the fall of the underlying.
Spread The product offers a capital return of 100% plus a participation related to the
spread between the performances of different underlyings (shares, rates.).
Bull Bear The final return is based on a percentage of the absolute performance of the
underlying at maturity.




Step 4: Underlying Selection
Best of Option The return is based on the performance of the best performing underlying
assets.
Worst of Option The return is based on the participation in the performance of the worst per-
forming underlying assets.
Himalaya A pre-selected number of best-performing assets are permanently removed from
the basket, or frozen at their performance level, at the end of each period until
the end of the investment.
Kilimanjaro The lowest performing assets as well as the best performing assets have been
progressively eliminated, or ignored from subsequent calculations, during the
investment period.




Step 5: Exposure Modulation: Increased Downside
Reverse Convertible The product is capital guaranteed unless a performance criterion is not satis-
fied. In this case, the capital return is reduced by the percentage fall in the
underlying, or the product pays back a predefined number of shares/bonds.
Precipice The product is capital guaranteed unless a performance criterion is not satisfied.
In this case, the final return is 0.
Step 6: Exposure Modulation: Limited Upside
Cap The return is based on the participation in the performance of the worst per-
forming underlying assets.
Fixed Upside The best performances of a basket of stocks or of a set of subperiod returns are
replaced by a predetermined fixed return.
Flip Flop The coupons are fixed in the first periods, and the provider has the right to
switch you into floating.
Step 7: Path Dependence
Cliquet The final return is determined by the sum of returns over some pre-set periods.
Asian Option The final return is determined by the average underlying returns over some
pre-set periods.
Parisian Option The value of the return depends on the number of days in the period in which
the conditions are satisfied.
Averaging The final index level is calculated as the average of the last readings over a
given period (more than one month).
Delay Coupons are rolled up and paid only at maturity.
Catch-up If a coupon is not attributed in a given period because the condition required for
the payment is not met, then that missed coupon and any subsequently missed
coupon will be rolled-up and attributed the next period when the condition is
met.
Lookback The initial/final index level is replaced by the lowest/highest level over the
period.
Step 8: Exotic Condition
American Option The conditions must be satisfied during the whole considered period.
Range The performance of the underlying is within a range.
Target The sum of the coupon reaches a predefined level.
Moving Strike The conditional levels are moving.
Bunch The top barrier/cap concerns each asset whereas the bottom barrier concerns
the whole basket.
Podium The underlying is a basket and the final returns depend on the number of shares
satisfying the conditions.
Annapurna The condition must be satisfied for any security in the underlying basket.
Step 9: Early Redemption
Knockout The product matures early if specific conditions are satisfied.
Callable The issuer can terminate the product on any coupon date.
Puttable The investor can terminate the product on any coupon date.
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B Figures
Figure 1. Volume Sold per Year, in billion euros
This figure shows volume issuance of tranche products over the period 1996-2011 in the European market,
in billion Euros. Included countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-




















































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Evolution of Complexity over Years
This figure shows the coefficient estimates of the year dummies in a standard OLS regression of the
complexity proxies with country fixed effects.
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Figure 4. Strategic Structuring
This figure illustrates the evolution of issuance of two types of products: reverse convertible and call
products and of the Implicit Volatility Index.
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C Tables
Table 1 . Country-Level Summary Statistics
This tables reports the sum of total volume sold since market inception, outstanding vol-
umes in 2010, number of products sold in 2010, and the average product size in 2010. The
last column shows the penetration rate of retail structured products defined as the share
of financial savings invested in this category of financial products.
Total Issue Volumes N. of Products Average Size % Fin. Savings
Country Since 1996 2010 2010 2010 2010
Billion Euros Billion Euros Number Million Euros Percent
Italy 343 98 676 145 2.8
Spain 204 50 663 75 2.8
Germany 162 109 2685 41 2.3
France 158 78 275 283 2
Switzerland 150 55 4997 11 3.8
Belgium 135 78 486 160 8.5
UK 110 57 871 65 1.1
Netherlands 37 18 173 107 1.1
Sweden 34 14 779 18 2
Portugal 24 13 181 70 3.2
Austria 20 17 767 22 3.3
Denmark 17 4.8 55 87 .82
Ireland 16 6.5 164 40 2.1
Norway 15 .92 52 18 .28
Finland 9 5.1 267 19 2.1
Poland 8 4.2 443 9.4 1.5
Czech Republic 6 3.3 196 17 2.8
Hungary 2 2 73 28 1.9
Total 1450 613 13803 44 3
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Table 2 . Provider Types - Summary Statistics
This tables reports the distribution of providers by specialization across countries in 2010.
Providers are divided into 4 categories: Commercial and Savings Banks (Comm./Sav.),
Private Banking (P. B.), Insurance (Insurance) and Other (Other)
Provider Specialization
Country Comm./Sav. P. B. Insurance Other Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Italy 24 68.6% 6 17.1% 3 8.6% 2 5.7% 35 100.0%
Spain 28 82.4% 6 17.6% - - - - 34 100.0%
Germany 18 69.2% 8 30.8% - - - - 26 100.0%
France 7 18.4% 22 57.9% 5 13.2% 4 10.5% 38 100.0%
Switzerland 18 58.1% 11 35.5% 1 3.2% 1 3.2% 31 100.0%
Belgium 14 53.8% 8 30.8% 4 15.4% - - 26 100.0%
UK 6 60.0% 4 40.0% - - - - 10 100.0%
Netherlands 7 50.0% 7 50.0% - - - - 14 100.0%
Sweden 9 47.4% 10 52.6% - - - - 19 100.0%
Portugal 10 76.9% 3 23.1% - - - - 13 100.0%
Austria 16 64.0% 7 28.0% 2 8.0% - - 25 100.0%
Denmark 9 81.8% - - - - 2 18.2% 11 100.0%
Ireland 6 31.6% 13 68.4% - - - - 19 100.0%
Norway 4 50.0% 4 50.0% - - - - 8 100.0%
Finland 9 47.4% 8 42.1% 1 5.3% 1 5.3% 19 100.0%
Poland 17 73.9% 3 13.0% 3 13.0% - - 23 100.0%
Czech Rep. 7 50.0% 3 21.4% 4 28.6% - - 14 100.0%
Hungary 6 66.7% 1 11.1% 1 11.1% 1 11.1% 9 100.0%
Total 215 57.5% 124 33.2% 24 6.4% 11 2.9% 374 100.0%
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Table 3 . Providers and Issuance, Summary Statistics
This tables reports the distribution of product types issued since inception by providers
and level of capital protection. Providers are sorted by market share.
Capital Protection
Provider <100% 100% Total
No. Col % No. Col % No. Col %
Raiffeisen 1,926 44.6% 2,397 55.4% 4,323 100.0%
German Landesbank 1,312 42.0% 1,811 58.0% 3,123 100.0%
UBS 1,197 44.8% 1,473 55.2% 2,670 100.0%
Vontobel 2,269 93.7% 153 6.3% 2,422 100.0%
KBC 390 17.5% 1,834 82.5% 2,224 100.0%
EFG Bank 1,944 93.9% 126 6.1% 2,070 100.0%
Deutsche Bank 1,071 54.6% 890 45.4% 1,961 100.0%
Societe Generale 987 62.2% 600 37.8% 1,587 100.0%
Clariden Leu 1,443 92.2% 122 7.8% 1,565 100.0%
ING 742 42.6% 999 57.4% 1,741 100.0%
RBS 446 30.9% 997 69.1% 1,443 100.0%
JP Morgan 883 64.1% 494 35.9% 1,377 100.0%
Caja de Ahorros 33 2.5% 1,288 97.5% 1,321 100.0%
Nordea 613 50.1% 610 49.9% 1,223 100.0%
Unicredit 638 56.2% 498 43.8% 1,136 100.0%
Credit Suisse 779 67.7% 372 32.3% 1,151 100.0%
Barclays 383 32.1% 809 67.9% 1,192 100.0%
BNP Paribas 681 59.4% 465 40.6% 1,146 100.0%
Volksbank 414 38.2% 670 61.8% 1,084 100.0%
Commerzbank 813 76.0% 257 24.0% 1,070 100.0%
Other 12,087 35.3% 22,109 64.7% 34,196 100.0%
Total 31,051 44.3% 38,974 55.7% 70,025 100.0%
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Table 4 . Payoff Structure, Summary Statistics
This tables reports the distribution of payoff features in the payoff structure algorithm
describe in section 4 over years.
2002 2006 2010 Total
% % % %
Underlying Asset Class
Equity (Single Stock) 51.3% 51.5% 34.0% 40.4%
Equity (Index) 30.6% 26.2% 34.8% 31.9%
Interest Rate 3.2% 4.9% 12.9% 9.9%
Commodity 0.2% 2.2% 4.3% 3.4%
Other 14.7% 15.3% 14.1% 14.5%
Product Type
Coupon 15.2% 37.2% 72.6% 58.5%
Participation 84.8% 62.8% 27.4% 41.5%
Primary Structure
Call 63.5% 44.5% 21.2% 30.7%
Pure Income 4.8% 11.0% 37.2% 27.3%
Digital 6.0% 17.0% 20.4% 18.6%
Floater 1.9% 7.2% 14.7% 11.6%
Other 23.9% 20.4% 6.6% 11.9%
Diversification
Basket 57.7% 45.3% 42.9% 44.4%
Deposit 4.8% 2.4% 1.6% 2.0%
None 37.5% 52.2% 55.5% 53.5%
Exotic Condition
Range 0.4% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0%
American Option 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Other 0.6% 2.0% 0.1% 0.8%
None 98.7% 96.5% 98.5% 97.9%
Underlying Selection
Worst 5.2% 5.2% 24.8% 17.7%
Best 10.2% 8.9% 2.9% 5.1%
Other 5.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.6%
None 79.1% 85.3% 72.1% 76.6%
Exposure Modulation: Increased Downside
Reverse Convertible 1.9% 21.2% 47.2% 36.7%
None 98.1% 78.8% 52.8% 63.3%
Exposure Modulation: Limited Upside
Cap 18.5% 14.0% 21.3% 18.9%
Fixed Upside 0.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.0%
None 81.3% 85.3% 77.6% 80.2%
Early Maturity
Knockout 0.6% 14.1% 18.5% 16.2%
Callable 2.0% 2.8% 4.1% 3.6%
Other 1.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
None 96.2% 82.5% 76.7% 79.5%
Path Dependance
Averaging 28.9% 23.0% 8.3% 14.0%
Asian Option 2.1% 2.6% 0.7% 1.3%
Other 0.9% 0.5% 2.8% 2.0%
None 68.1% 73.9% 88.3% 82.7%
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Table 5 . Number of Payoff Features, Summary Statistics
This tables reports summary statistics on the number of payoff features over product cat-
egory and years. Section 2 describes the method implemented to break down any payoff
formula in basic features.
Year Mean Min Median Max
Product Type
Capital not Guaranteed 3.1 1 3 7
Capital Guaranteed 2.4 1 2 8
Year
2002 2.5 1 2 6
2006 2.6 1 2 8
2010 2.9 1 3 7
Provider Type
Comm./Savings 2.6 1 3 8
Private Banking 2.9 1 3 7
























Table 7 . Number of Bias, Summary Statistics
This tables reports summary statistics on the number of bias over product category and
years. Section 2 describes the method implemented to match product to behavioral biases.
Year Mean Min Median Max
Product Type
Capital not Guaranteed 3.9 0 4 9
Capital Guaranteed 2.4 0 2 8
Year
2002 2.6 0 3 7
2006 2.9 0 3 9
2010 3.6 0 3 9
Provider Type
Comm./Savings 3.1 0 3 9
Private Banking 3.5 0 3 9
Total 3.2 0 3 9
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Table 8. Strategic Structuring
This table shows probit regressions. The dependant variables indicate 1 if the payoff struc-
ture includes a reverse convertible feature in columns (1) and (2) and a cap feature in
columns (3) and (4). Implicit Volatility is the Implicit Volatility Index (VIX). The three
columns introduce country fixed effects. Column (2) and (4) show t-stat clustered by
providers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reverse Convertible Reverse Convertible Cap Cap
Implicit Volatility 0.00486*** 0.00477** 0.00797*** 0.00820**
(0.000566) (0.00198) (0.000537) (0.00358)
Swap Rate, 5 years -0.131*** -0.134** -0.0471*** -0.0405
(0.00658) (0.0621) (0.00638) (0.0341)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster No Provider No Provider
Observations 82528 80132 82528 80132
Pseudo R2 0.280 0.283 0.031 0.031
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9. Competition and Complexity
This table shows regressions in which complexity proxies are regressed on the number of
competing providers per country (Compet./Country) . The complexity proxy is the number
of payoff features in columns (1) to (3), and the number of fitted bias in column (4) to (6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N. Payoffs N. Payoffs N. Payoffs N. Fitted Bias N. Fitted Bias N. Fitted Bias
Compet./Country 0.00852*** 0.00498*** 0.00498 0.0138*** 0.0211*** 0.0211***
(0.000742) (0.00115) (0.00374) (0.00125) (0.00193) (0.00681)
Term 0.0596*** 0.0628*** 0.0628*** 0.0801*** 0.0819*** 0.0819***
(0.00238) (0.00240) (0.0115) (0.00357) (0.00361) (0.0205)
Capital Protion -0.548*** -0.544*** -0.544*** -1.616*** -1.611*** -1.611***
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0705) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.167)
Country F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F. E. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cluster No No Provider No No Provider
Observations 73540 73540 73540 73540 73540 73540
R2 0.150 0.155 0.155 0.270 0.275 0.275
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 10. Financial Literacy
This table shows regressions in which complexity proxies are regressed on a private banking
dummy, product term in years and the interaction between the private banking dummy
and term. The complexity proxy is the number of payoff features in columns (1) to (3),
and the number of fitted bias in column (4) to (6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N. Payoffs N. Payoffs N. Payoffs countbias countbias countbias
Private Banking -0.0206 0.249*** 0.249 0.328*** 0.954*** 0.954***
(0.0338) (0.0416) (0.203) (0.0629) (0.0766) (0.344)
Term 0.0261*** 0.0407*** 0.0407*** -0.0390*** -0.00506 -0.00506
(0.00251) (0.00289) (0.0142) (0.00407) (0.00457) (0.0317)
Private Banking*Term -0.0567*** -0.0567 -0.132*** -0.132*
(0.00542) (0.0378) (0.00914) (0.0695)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Sd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster No No Provider No No Provider
Observations 72381 72381 72381 72381 72381 72381
R2 0.120 0.122 0.122 0.175 0.177 0.177
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Table 11. Financial Literacy and Wrapper Type
This table shows regressions in which complexity proxies are regressed on a private banking
dummy, wrapper type dummies (deposit, fund, life insurance, security), and the interaction
between the private banking and wrapper type dummies. Deposit is omitted. Year and
country fixed effects are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Description Length Condition Number N. Payoffs countbias
Private banking -27.56*** -0.222*** -0.119*** -0.808***
(6.136) (0.0468) (0.0294) (0.0617)
Fund*Private Banking 69.83*** 0.686*** 0.183*** 1.351***
(13.08) (0.101) (0.0648) (0.130)
Life Insurance*Private Banking 18.04** 0.228*** 0.232*** 1.018***
(8.348) (0.0606) (0.0473) (0.0925)
Security*Private Banking 39.41*** 0.358*** 0.219*** 1.069***
(6.794) (0.0528) (0.0336) (0.0693)
Observations 33258 33258 33298 33298
R2 0.149 0.242 0.118 0.211
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 12. Financial Literacy and Wrapper Type, Providers Fixed Effects
This table shows regressions in which complexity proxies are regressed on a private banking
dummy, wrapper type dummies (deposit, fund, life insurance, security), and the interaction
between the private banking and wrapper type dummies. Deposit is omitted. Year, country
and provider fixed effects are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Description Length Condition Number N. Payoffs countbias
Private banking 5.321 0.277** 0.182** -0.0911
(14.78) (0.114) (0.0781) (0.141)
Fund*Private banking 71.91*** 0.424** -0.0128 0.768***
(20.90) (0.166) (0.104) (0.203)
Life Insurance*Private banking -4.390 -0.288** -0.0715 0.218
(20.15) (0.140) (0.126) (0.229)
Security*Private banking 16.39 0.230** -0.158** 0.656***
(14.15) (0.110) (0.0747) (0.135)
Observations 31897 31897 31937 31937
R2 0.233 0.317 0.185 0.286
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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